Re: [DNSOP] I-D Action: draft-vixie-dns-rpz-04.txt

ac <ac@main.me> Mon, 19 December 2016 08:40 UTC

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Date: Mon, 19 Dec 2016 10:39:55 +0200
From: ac <ac@main.me>
To: sthaug@nethelp.no
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] I-D Action: draft-vixie-dns-rpz-04.txt
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On Mon, 19 Dec 2016 09:16:28 +0100 (CET)
sthaug@nethelp.no wrote:
> > > So if this is the IP of a phishing site or the IP of an command
> > > and control host that tells its bot to execute criminal action
> > > you still valid the accuracy of the answer higher then possible
> > > damage this could do to your user?
> > yes. 
> > In your example, ethically, it is a problem that should be
> > addressed on IP, not on DNS
> > 
> > It is never okay to tell lies.
> 
> Unfortunately the real world isn't that simple.
> 
it actually is.

> Sometimes you are required by law to tell lies. Case in point: Various

it still is never okay to lie and to deceive.

If the law requires you to answer example.com as ipv4 xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx

The law does not say : send "Pirate Bay" to "example.com" to deceive
your users! it may instruct you to send coca-cola.org to coca-cola.com

but I am not aware of any court (on the planet?) that instructs people
to lie, cheat, steal or deceive - maybe in the interests of national
security, etc. - but arguing that is like pulling the dam from underneath the duck.

 so, factually, the law is not instructing you to lie or to deceive.

the law is saying: do not resolve "pirate bay" or lie to your users or
deceive your users!

Why would you say (or think that?)

your reply is not addressing dishonesty at all?

This is a simply  about ethics. 

dishonesty




> domains belonging to Pirate Bay and several other torrent providers
> have been explicitly blocked in Norway - explicitly as in: The biggest
> ISPs in Norway (I happen to work for one of these) have been told by
> the Oslo district court to block access to a list of domains supplied
> by the court, and that this is to be implemented through DNS blocking
> (lies, if you will).
> 
> It doesn't matter whether I *like* this or not, and it also doesn't
> matter whether the domains in question are easily available by using
> OpenDNS, Google Public DNS, running your own name server, etc. ISPs
> are still required to block access as long as the verdict from the
> Oslo district court is valid.
> 
> Today this blocking is done without using RPZ. Having RPZ standardized
> and implemented in more DNS software would make it possible to perform
> the same blocking as mentioned above with fewer moving parts and thus
> a simpler system less likely to have "interesting" failure modes.
> 
> Note that it makes absolutely no difference to the blocking described
> above whether the RPZ draft is published as an RFC or not - in both
> cases the blocking would still be performed, because it is required
> by law.
> 
> Steinar Haug, AS2116