Re: [ietf-smtp] Possible contribution to moving forward with RFC5321bis SMTP

Richard Clayton <richard@highwayman.com> Wed, 01 January 2020 18:40 UTC

Return-Path: <richard@highwayman.com>
X-Original-To: ietf-smtp@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietf-smtp@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 91FDD1200CE for <ietf-smtp@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 1 Jan 2020 10:40:22 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.9
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.9 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id rFTgcSK8oI_X for <ietf-smtp@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 1 Jan 2020 10:40:19 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mail.highwayman.com (mail.highwayman.com [82.69.6.249]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C26571200C4 for <ietf-smtp@ietf.org>; Wed, 1 Jan 2020 10:40:19 -0800 (PST)
Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1]:23449 helo=happyday.al.cl.cam.ac.uk) by mail.highwayman.com with esmtp (Exim 4.92.3) (envelope-from <richard@highwayman.com>) id 1imiun-000EK6-Ap for ietf-smtp@ietf.org; Wed, 01 Jan 2020 18:40:17 +0000
Message-ID: <2Iq+URBKeODeFANB@highwayman.com>
Date: Wed, 01 Jan 2020 18:40:10 +0000
To: ietf-smtp@ietf.org
From: Richard Clayton <richard@highwayman.com>
References: <20200101175510.8549A11E2905@ary.qy> <D441E0BE-1F32-4329-9296-A5026540E8D0@dukhovni.org> <994e7a23-9e80-4751-6067-8863ad0ee72f@network-heretics.com>
In-Reply-To: <994e7a23-9e80-4751-6067-8863ad0ee72f@network-heretics.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-Mailer: Turnpike Integrated Version 5.03 M <MH3$+Leg77fhUMKLTVW+diQNvG>
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ietf-smtp/XsyU8srqgUpRkx35T5Ogwbc0j-0>
Subject: Re: [ietf-smtp] Possible contribution to moving forward with RFC5321bis SMTP
X-BeenThere: ietf-smtp@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: "Discussion of issues related to Simple Mail Transfer Protocol \(SMTP\) \[RFC 821, RFC 2821, RFC 5321\]" <ietf-smtp.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/ietf-smtp>, <mailto:ietf-smtp-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/ietf-smtp/>
List-Post: <mailto:ietf-smtp@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:ietf-smtp-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf-smtp>, <mailto:ietf-smtp-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 01 Jan 2020 18:40:23 -0000

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

In message <994e7a23-9e80-4751-6067-8863ad0ee72f@network-heretics.com>,
Keith Moore <moore@network-heretics.com> writes

>And since this would be entirely new practice, it would at least be 
>possible to require Organization Validation or Extended Validation 
>certificates as a condition of accepting mail, or more likely, as a 
>condition of not pessimizing mail... 

We cannot prescribe whether a receiver is going to accept email, you can
merely state what the correct protocol is for the transfer and for
efficient signalling of accept/reject decisions.

>and/or set up email-specific CAs 
>for the purpose of authenticating SMTP clients.
>
>I don't claim that it's simple to make this work - the devil is, as 
>always, in the details.   I don't think there is a magic bullet.   But I 
>do see client cert authentication of SMTP-over-TLS as another potential 
>tool in the toolbox.

No-one in the world of large scale transfer thought that server certs
from existing CAs (or DANE and its reliance on DNSSEC) were going to
work reliably at scale ... so the bulk handlers of email went for (and
have deployed) MTA-STS (RFC8461) instead.

I doubt that the views of the practicality of using client certs would
be all that different.

Note that the driver for MTA-STS was nothing to do with preventing abuse
in the sense its used in this thread so far (the bad guys are far better
at adopting new standards, configuring correctly etc than the good guys
are) ... but to address the threat of events such as BGP hijacks causing
mail flows to go to the wrong place... or middleboxes removing
encryption from connections

- -- 
richard                                                   Richard Clayton

Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary 
Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety. Benjamin Franklin 11 Nov 1755

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: PGPsdk version 1.7.1

iQA/AwUBXgznit2nQQHFxEViEQKKlACfTDRUTykzXDHwFltSRXGj+aUxrsYAoKe1
AzRgZqI7ix8VK0ia6OeGu8oQ
=R9/n
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----