Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image (was Re: Packet number encryption)
Kazuho Oku <kazuhooku@gmail.com> Thu, 08 February 2018 03:54 UTC
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From: Kazuho Oku <kazuhooku@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 08 Feb 2018 12:54:45 +0900
Message-ID: <CANatvzxt3CvWapVcd++PBG1OyJypXct9xWHVnsicu2mf-atC6g@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image (was Re: Packet number encryption)
To: Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema.net>
Cc: IETF QUIC WG <quic@ietf.org>
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2018-02-08 11:08 GMT+09:00 Kazuho Oku <kazuhooku@gmail.com>: > 2018-02-08 9:37 GMT+09:00 Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema.net>: >> >> >> On 2/7/2018 1:10 AM, Kazuho Oku wrote: >>> The pros of using a sequence that randomly distributes 0 and ones >>> (i.e. PI or xorshift+) is that you can extract good loss / reordering >>> information if the error rate is low. >>> >>> OTOH, it is fragile to high error rate or certain patterns of error. >>> Let me explain two examples. >>> >>> Consider the case where the packet loss rate is 50%. I doubt if you >>> could use pattern matching against those sequences to figure out the >>> loss rate. This is because the power among the sequence is mostly high >>> frequencies. If you use a sequence that distributes power among lower >>> frequencies (like square wave or sin wave that I discussed), you can >>> calculate the loss rate in such cases as well. >> >> Actually, it should be possible to build a maximum likelihood decoder >> for an xorshift sending pattern. You are mostly concerned with erasure >> and permutations, and you roughly know the range of probability, so you >> can see likelihood of 1, 2, 3, etc. erasures, or permutations in some >> range. Obviously, the range that you can manage depends on the length of >> the code. If you can keep the decoder synchronized, you will be able to >> measure the erasure rate. > > I agree with you that it is possible to detect loss / reorder if the > decoder can be kept synchronized. > > What I am questioning is the possibility of keeping the decoder > synchronized under heavy loss / reorder. > >> If it looses synchronization, you know that >> the error rate is truly horrendous, and that's information too. > > I disagree. > > It might be true that loosing synchronization due to heavy loss can be > a signal. OTOH, loosing synchronization due to massive reorder is not > an issue if the reorder resolves in a certain timeframe (IIRC 1/8 > RTT). > > My understanding is that the middleboxes' reliance to the sequence > number has led to the ossification of TCP. The ossification has > prevented us from doing some nifty things, such as sending some TCP > packets through a different node while answering others directly. In > QUIC, I am interested in doing such things, and I would expect that > others will be. > > Considering that, I would prefer not to exposing a signal that could > give false information to observers when there is a "good" reorder. Please let me paraphrase the last sentence to the following: I would prefer using a signal that is tolerant to "good" reorder (i.e. happening frequently but resolving in a fraction of RTT so that they don't trigger a retransmit). Anyways, I think that we are making progress in sense that we are discussing what is the "best" way to achieve loss / reorder observability using 1 bit, rather than using multiple bits. Use of less bits lead to less chance of leaking information as well as finding space to store the information. > >> And >> xorshift codes are self synchronizing, so you will regain >> synchronization quickly. >> >> -- Christian Huitema >> > > > > -- > Kazuho Oku -- Kazuho Oku
- Packet number encryption Martin Thomson
- Re: Packet number encryption Ian Swett
- Re: Packet number encryption Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Packet number encryption Eric Rescorla
- Re: Packet number encryption Christian Huitema
- Re: Packet number encryption Martin Thomson
- Re: Packet number encryption Mirja Kühlewind
- Re: Packet number encryption Gorry Fairhurst
- Re: Packet number encryption Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Packet number encryption Eggert, Lars
- Re: Packet number encryption Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Packet number encryption Martin Thomson
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Martin Thomson
- Re: Packet number encryption Roberto Peon
- Re: Packet number encryption Martin Thomson
- Re: Packet number encryption Ted Hardie
- Re: Packet number encryption Ted Hardie
- Re: Packet number encryption Christian Huitema
- Re: Packet number encryption Roberto Peon
- Re: Packet number encryption Martin Thomson
- Re: Packet number encryption Christian Huitema
- Re: Packet number encryption Jana Iyengar
- RE: Packet number encryption Roni Even (A)
- Re: Packet number encryption Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Packet number encryption Roberto Peon
- Re: Packet number encryption Roberto Peon
- Re: Packet number encryption Martin Duke
- Re: Packet number encryption Kazuho Oku
- Re: Packet number encryption Christian Huitema
- Re: Packet number encryption Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Mirja Kühlewind
- Re: Packet number encryption Mirja Kühlewind
- Re: Packet number encryption Kazuho Oku
- Re: Packet number encryption Dmitri Tikhonov
- Re: Packet number encryption Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Packet number encryption Fossati, Thomas (Nokia - GB/Cambridge, UK)
- Re: Packet number encryption Jana Iyengar
- RE: Packet number encryption Piotr Galecki
- Re: Re: Packet number encryption alexandre.ferrieux
- Re: Packet number encryption Patrick McManus
- Re: Packet number encryption Fossati, Thomas (Nokia - GB/Cambridge)
- Re: Packet number encryption Stephen Farrell
- Re: Packet number encryption Roberto Peon
- RE: Packet number encryption Piotr Galecki
- RE: Packet number encryption Roni Even (A)
- RE: Packet number encryption Lubashev, Igor
- RE: Packet number encryption Lubashev, Igor
- RE: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Christian Huitema
- RE: Packet number encryption Lubashev, Igor
- Re: Packet number encryption Stephen Farrell
- Re: Packet number encryption Fossati, Thomas (Nokia - GB/Cambridge)
- Re: Packet number encryption Fossati, Thomas (Nokia - GB/Cambridge)
- Re: Packet number encryption Stephen Farrell
- Re: Packet number encryption Willy Tarreau
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Packet number encryption Christian Huitema
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Packet number encryption Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Packet number encryption Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Reducing ossification through protocol design (wa… Brian Trammell (IETF)
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Packet number encryption Roberto Peon
- Re: Packet number encryption Roberto Peon
- Re: Packet number encryption Salz, Rich
- Re: Packet number encryption Jana Iyengar
- RE: Packet number encryption Roni Even
- Re: Packet number encryption Christian Huitema
- RE: Packet number encryption Roni Even (A)
- Re: Packet number encryption Roberto Peon
- Re: Reducing ossification through protocol design… Gorry Fairhurst
- Re: Packet number encryption Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Packet number encryption Kazuho Oku
- RE: Packet number encryption Roni Even (A)
- Re: Reducing ossification through protocol design… Mirja Kühlewind
- Re: Reducing ossification through protocol design… Salz, Rich
- Re: Reducing ossification through protocol design… Mirja Kühlewind
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Packet number encryption Mike Bishop
- RE: Reducing ossification through protocol design… Mike Bishop
- Re: Packet number encryption Jana Iyengar
- Re: Packet number encryption Jana Iyengar
- Re: Packet number encryption Martin Thomson
- Re: Packet number encryption Ted Hardie
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Packet number encryption Marten Seemann
- RE: Packet number encryption Roni Even (A)
- Re: Packet number encryption Marten Seemann
- Re: Packet number encryption Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Packet number encryption Kazuho Oku
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Gorry Fairhurst
- Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image (wa… Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image (wa… Brian Trammell (IETF)
- RE: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Roni Even (A)
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Mirja Kühlewind
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Stephen Farrell
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Kazuho Oku
- RE: Packet number encryption Mike Bishop
- Re: Packet number encryption Jana Iyengar
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Eric Rescorla
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Ian Swett
- Re: Packet number encryption Christian Huitema
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Packet number encryption Martin Thomson
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Packet number encryption Christian Huitema
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Packet number encryption Christian Huitema
- Re: Packet number encryption Marten Seemann
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Martin Thomson
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Mirja Kühlewind
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Packet number encryption Brian Trammell (IETF)
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Christian Huitema
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Christian Huitema
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Explicit measurability in the QUIC wire image… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Packet number encryption Victor Vasiliev
- Re: Packet number encryption Salz, Rich
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Packet number encryption Mike Bishop
- Re: Packet number encryption Christian Huitema
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Packet number encryption Mike Bishop
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- RE: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- RE: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Salz, Rich
- Re: Packet number encryption Eric Rescorla
- Re: Packet number encryption Eric Rescorla
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Eric Rescorla
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Ian Swett
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Packet number encryption Salz, Rich
- Re: Packet number encryption Ian Swett
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Packet number encryption David Benjamin
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Packet number encryption Deval, Manasi
- RE: Packet number encryption Deval, Manasi
- Re: Packet number encryption Victor Vasiliev
- RE: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: hardware offload (was: Packet number encrypti… Ian Swett
- Re: Packet number encryption Ian Swett
- Re: Packet number encryption Martin Thomson
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Packet number encryption Salz, Rich
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: hardware offload (was: Packet number encrypti… Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Packet number encryption Salz, Rich
- RE: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Victor Vasiliev
- Re: hardware offload (was: Packet number encrypti… Christian Huitema
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: hardware offload (was: Packet number encrypti… Eggert, Lars
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: hardware offload (was: Packet number encrypti… Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Packet number encryption Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Victor Vasiliev
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Kazuho Oku
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Packet number encryption Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen