Re: [Shutup] [ietf-smtp] Proposed Charter for the "SMTP Headers Unhealthy To User Privacy" WG (fwd)

Ted Lemon <> Mon, 30 November 2015 23:06 UTC

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From: Ted Lemon <>
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Date: Mon, 30 Nov 2015 23:06:17 +0000
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Subject: Re: [Shutup] [ietf-smtp] Proposed Charter for the "SMTP Headers Unhealthy To User Privacy" WG (fwd)
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Monday, Nov 30, 2015 6:02 PM Dave Crocker wrote:
> On 11/30/2015 2:51 PM, Ted Lemon wrote:
>> Why would I be relaying mail on?   Only for a mailing list.   For the mailing list, what I want SPF to validate is that the mail came from the mailing list. 
> The most obvious is mailbox aliasing, such as for vanity addresses such
> as university alumni associations provide.

That's a mailing list with one subscriber.   Same scenario.

> Email is store and forward, and this can and does mean transit across
> /multiple/ independent administrative domains.  The fact that the vast
> majority of mail goes directly (one hop) from origin AD to the
> recipient's AD does not mean it is reasonable for anyone to make
> systemic design decisions that constrain that fundamental flexibility.

Sure, but in order for this argument to apply to the present discussion, we would have to be able to show that what is being proposed would constrain that fundamental flexibility, and I don't think it does.

> IMO an essential design benefit in many/most aspects of Internet
> technologies is avoiding making any more global assumptions (or
> requirements) than essential.  "Deferring to the end systems" is a very
> broad-based design requirement and it includes minimizing assumptions
> about the transit infrastructure.

Sure, but in this case wouldn't deferring to the end systems argue in favor of allowing end systems to make the decision as to whether their private information should be exposed?

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