Re: [TLS] Cert Enumeration and Key Assurance With DNSSEC

Ben Laurie <benl@google.com> Fri, 01 October 2010 16:02 UTC

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Date: Fri, 1 Oct 2010 09:02:48 -0700
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From: Ben Laurie <benl@google.com>
To: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
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Cc: pkix@ietf.org, dnsop@ietf.org, saag@ietf.org, tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] Cert Enumeration and Key Assurance With DNSSEC
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On 1 October 2010 08:29, Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com> wrote:
> The reason that I started with the requirement to use SSL is that security
> policy relating to trust criteria is meaningless until you have a statement
> that use of SSL is required.

I can't agree with this. If a user types an https URL, say, then
there's every reason security policy should apply despite the lack of
a statement that SSL is required.

> I have no objection to doing security policy. But I do have a real objection
> to an approach that negates PKIX semantics as the TLSFP approach does.

Then I'd like to see your proposal for _optionally_ allowing PKIX to
be overridden.