Re: [TLS] [DNSOP] [saag] [pkix] Cert Enumeration and Key Assurance With DNSSEC

Doug Barton <dougb@dougbarton.us> Mon, 11 October 2010 04:16 UTC

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Date: Sun, 10 Oct 2010 21:11:10 -0700
From: Doug Barton <dougb@dougbarton.us>
Organization: http://SupersetSolutions.com/
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Cc: pkix@ietf.org, dnsop@ietf.org, saag@ietf.org, tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] [DNSOP] [saag] [pkix] Cert Enumeration and Key Assurance With DNSSEC
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On 10/5/2010 1:00 AM, der Mouse wrote:
> But the original statement was that DNSSEC provides "secure"
> association from name to IP.  This is a stronger property than
> providing secure distribution of name-to-IP mapping information; it
> also implies that the creation of that information and its injection
> into the distribution mechanisms are "secure" (whatever that means - I
> note that none of these say what they are talking about being secure
> against; perhaps I'm just missing context).

Sorry, almost nothing you wrote above is true. The only thing that 
DNSSEC has ever claimed to be able to do is provide a way for the end 
user of the DNS data to prove to herself that the data they received is 
the data that the administrator of the zone wanted them to have. The use 
of the word "security" in the name of the protocol extension was an 
incredibly unfortunate choice because it conveys all of the 
misunderstandings you listed above, and a lot more.


Doug

-- 

Breadth of IT experience, and    |   Nothin' ever doesn't change,
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