Re: [TLS] [pkix] Cert Enumeration and Key Assurance With DNSSEC

[Bruno Harbulot <[e-mail]>]

On 04/10/10 21:04, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
> <Lots of statements concerning how CAs work>
>
> For the past five years, CA certificates have been divided into Domain
> Validated and Extended Validated. As some of you know, I instigated the
> process that led to the creation of EV certs because I was very worried
> about the low quality of many DV certificates.
>
>
> Some DV certificates are of very low quality. Which is why I would like
> to see the padlock icon phased out entirely. Why does the user need to
> know if encryption is being used at all?

I'm still not convinced about the greatness of EV certificates.

Why should an organization that wants to deploy its own PKI have to 
depend on one of the big players who've managed to get their signature 
hard-coded into browsers?

How beneficial are EV certs for the end-users? Green-bar secure v.s. 
Blue-bar insecure (or less secure) really is a confusing 
over-simplification.

A DV certs bind a cert to a domain, whereas an EV cert bind a cert to a 
company name. However, some companies use domain names that have nothing 
to do with their company name, and which could look like competitors 
instead: http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg06528.html


Best wishes,

Bruno.