Re: [TLS] [pkix] Cert Enumeration and Key Assurance With DNSSEC

[Ralph Holz <[e-mail]>]

Hi,

>   I am guessing here that you are in favor of pinning certs?
> If my guess is correct, can you tell us all why you are?

I am not sure I am in favour. The practical argument for it would be
that a changed certificate should be reason for a user to stop for a
moment and think. OK for now, maybe. However, many certs have life-times
of 1 year or 2. Given that one day we may visit many more https-secured
sites, we would likely see more false alerts again soon, too - precisely
the thing that Firefox has been criticised for when it introduced its
new warning dialogue.

On a more theoretical basis, I am also not sure if the 1:1 binding of
"one entity/identity - one key" is desirable.

Still, given the current PKI trust model and the current state of PKI as
such, I would probably vote with those in favour of pinning for the moment.

> I am not as there are instances where a perfictly valid cert
> is used but that the issuing CA has had their Cert database
> hacked or corrupted and a secondary Cert becomes necessary
> or at least preferrable as a temporary fix.  Of course such
> a cert would need to be issued by a different CA.

Well... listening to CAs and their EV statements, such things should not
happen too often anyway. It should not be a argument against pinning.

-- 
Best regards,
Ralph