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Re: [TLS] Consensus Call on draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension

Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com> Thu, 05 April 2018 03:18 UTC

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Date: Wed, 04 Apr 2018 21:59:18 -0500
From: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Cc: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Consensus Call on draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension
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On Wed, Apr 04, 2018 at 07:56:37PM -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> On Wed, Apr 4, 2018 at 7:31 PM, Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com> wrote:
> > We cannot be serious about security while promoting a protocol with a
> > glaring downgrade attack.
> 
> Unfortunately, you are conflating the assertive and restrictive use cases.

I'm conflating nothing.  I want to be able to use this HTTPS with DANE,
but this extension as-is cannot be used in any protocol where it isn't
mandatory.

(Richard B. proposes that one can use this with HTTPS when using a CA
that is not likely to be trusted by some clients.  But that's hardly the
enticing use of this extension for HTTPS.  The interesting use-case is
DANE for HTTPS, with or without WebPKI, and having a method of possibly
deploying this.  By "possibly" I mean "incremental".)

> To recap, there are two potential reasons why one might want thi
> technology:
> 
> [...]

You're not being serious.  You're rationalizing the document as-is.

Nico
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