Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving DNS

Florian Weimer <fw@deneb.enyo.de> Sun, 10 August 2008 09:22 UTC

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From: Florian Weimer <fw@deneb.enyo.de>
To: Mark Andrews <Mark_Andrews@isc.org>
Cc: Duane <duane@e164.org>, bert hubert <bert.hubert@netherlabs.nl>, Namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving DNS
References: <200808080052.m780qMd2002912@drugs.dv.isc.org>
Date: Sun, 10 Aug 2008 11:16:57 +0200
In-Reply-To: <200808080052.m780qMd2002912@drugs.dv.isc.org> (Mark Andrews's message of "Fri, 08 Aug 2008 10:52:22 +1000")
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* Mark Andrews:

> 	You could have online keys and sign every response with a
> 	ttl + clock skew based window.  This requires that the
> 	private key is on all slaves.  The crypto hardware guys
> 	will love you :-)

Crypto accelerators for RSA are dead.  You can buy four 64x64 -> 128 bit
multipliers supporting a rate of more than 0.5 billion multiplications
per second each for 150 EUR.

> 	Which can be completely automated.  Has already been in
> 	some senarios.  I havn't re-signed my zones for months
> 	despite using a 30 day expiry period on the signatures.
>
> 	It is set and forget.  More and more of the process will
> 	become "set and forget" as the tools develop.

It's not just the tools.  It requires a change of minds, too.  For a
long time, DNSSEC operations were based not on classic DNS approaches,
but on the CA/PKI model (involving off-line keys, different registration
requirements, audit trails etc.).  However, for obvious reasons, hardly
anybody wanted to deploy it this way.

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