Re: how many angels can dance on the head of a pin?
Alex Bligh <alex@alex.org.uk> Sun, 10 August 2008 12:06 UTC
Return-Path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
X-Original-To: ietfarch-dnsext-archive@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietfarch-dnsext-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id A85E928C0FB; Sun, 10 Aug 2008 05:06:15 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 1.289
X-Spam-Level: *
X-Spam-Status: No, score=1.289 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.075, BAYES_20=-0.74, FH_RELAY_NODNS=1.451, HELO_MISMATCH_COM=0.553, RDNS_NONE=0.1]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id sQ8qSd2IBBcc; Sun, 10 Aug 2008 05:06:14 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from psg.com (psg.com [IPv6:2001:418:1::62]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id BE9B53A6DBB; Sun, 10 Aug 2008 05:06:14 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from majordom by psg.com with local (Exim 4.69 (FreeBSD)) (envelope-from <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>) id 1KS9YV-000B2n-Ti for namedroppers-data@psg.com; Sun, 10 Aug 2008 11:57:51 +0000
Received: from [217.147.82.63] (helo=mail.avalus.com) by psg.com with esmtp (Exim 4.69 (FreeBSD)) (envelope-from <alex@alex.org.uk>) id 1KS9YS-000B2V-9h for namedroppers@ops.ietf.org; Sun, 10 Aug 2008 11:57:50 +0000
Received: from [192.168.100.3] (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.avalus.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 43346C2DA3; Sun, 10 Aug 2008 12:57:43 +0100 (BST)
Date: Sun, 10 Aug 2008 13:01:26 +0100
From: Alex Bligh <alex@alex.org.uk>
Reply-To: Alex Bligh <alex@alex.org.uk>
To: Ben Laurie <ben@links.org>
cc: Duane at e164 dot org <duane@e164.org>, bmanning@vacation.karoshi.com, Namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>, Alex Bligh <alex@alex.org.uk>
Subject: Re: how many angels can dance on the head of a pin?
Message-ID: <9638F8EA548C822160EF40E4@nimrod.local>
In-Reply-To: <489ED142.8010500@links.org>
References: <200808080237.m782bBqk005628@drugs.dv.isc.org> <489BBA1C.1040107@e164.org> <489E4D44.1080306@links.org> <20080810042136.GA18568@vacation.karoshi.com.> <489E89B6.6090208@e164.org> <01B9CF1DF0A4A4443A6E73A4@nimrod.local> <489EAFCD.2090204@e164.org> <6751CAB7406138E7F72B474E@nimrod.local> <70CC931622BD9710F13283EA@nimrod.local> <489ED142.8010500@links.org>
X-Mailer: Mulberry/4.0.8 (Mac OS X)
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format="flowed"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Content-Disposition: inline
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Precedence: bulk
List-ID: <namedroppers.ops.ietf.org>
Ben, --On 10 August 2008 12:30:10 +0100 Ben Laurie <ben@links.org> wrote: >> I should have added that whilst non-broken NATs don't make things worse >> (*), they also don't make things better. > > Not so, actually. If the NAT does random port assignment, then the > resolver's assignment can be predictable. Yep quite possibly. My post was precaffeinated and I was referring to resolvers that were fixed-up, i.e. unpredictable. In practice though, I suspect (Roy will know better) that a NAT seeing traffic from a single internal (src IP, src port) tuple will continue to map that to a single external (src IP, src port) tuple because, unless it's doing deeper inspection than normal, it doesn't know which packets form separable conversations. So the improvement would only occur where the broken resolver used a non-constant but predictable port, which is the minority of cases. My point was that one should not think one can just stick a caching resolver behind a NAT device and suddenly achieve immunity from this particular poisoning attack. I presume you agree with that? Alex -- to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body. archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>
- Re: Additional filtering of responses Tony Finch
- Additional filtering of responses Wouter Wijngaards
- OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving DNS bert hubert
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Duane
- Re: Additional filtering of responses Paul Vixie
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Paul Vixie
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Paul Vixie
- RE: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Jesper G. Høy
- Re: Additional filtering of responses Roy Arends
- Re: Additional filtering of responses Paul Vixie
- Forgery resilience idea - wildcard cooperative de… Brian Dickson
- Re: Forgery resilience idea - wildcard cooperativ… Paul Vixie
- Re: Additional filtering of responses Roy Arends
- Re: Forgery resilience idea - wildcard cooperativ… bert hubert
- Re: Forgery resilience idea - wildcard cooperativ… Brian Dickson
- Re: Additional filtering of responses Edward Lewis
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Olaf Kolkman
- Re: Additional filtering of responses Tony Finch
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … David Conrad
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … bert hubert
- Re: Additional filtering of responses Edward Lewis
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Federico Lucifredi
- Re: Additional filtering of responses Paul Vixie
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Duane
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Mark Andrews
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Duane
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Duane
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Paul Vixie
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Paul Vixie
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Mark Andrews
- Re: Additional filtering of responses Mark Andrews
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Mark Andrews
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Duane
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Duane
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Duane
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Mark Andrews
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Duane
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Mark Andrews
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Duane
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Mark Andrews
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Duane
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Brian Dickson
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Mark Andrews
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Duane
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Duane
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Brian Dickson
- Re: Additional filtering of responses Masataka Ohta
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Duane
- Re: Additional filtering of responses Masataka Ohta
- Re: Additional filtering of responses Roy Arends
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Ralf Weber
- Re: Additional filtering of responses Masataka Ohta
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Duane at e164 dot org
- Re: Additional filtering of responses Duane at e164 dot org
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Ralf Weber
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Alex Bligh
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Duane at e164 dot org
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Duane at e164 dot org
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … sthaug
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … bert hubert
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Duane at e164 dot org
- Re: Additional filtering of responses Peter Koch
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Duane at e164 dot org
- Please stop this thread (was: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC gr… Andrew Sullivan
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Otmar Lendl
- Re: Please stop this thread (was: OFFTOPIC: DNSSE… Matt Larson
- Re: Please stop this thread (was: OFFTOPIC: DNSSE… David Conrad
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Ben Laurie
- how many angels can dance on the head of a pin? bmanning
- Re: how many angels can dance on the head of a pi… Duane at e164 dot org
- Re: how many angels can dance on the head of a pi… Alex Bligh
- Re: how many angels can dance on the head of a pi… Duane at e164 dot org
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Florian Weimer
- Re: how many angels can dance on the head of a pi… Alex Bligh
- Re: how many angels can dance on the head of a pi… Alex Bligh
- Re: how many angels can dance on the head of a pi… sthaug
- Re: how many angels can dance on the head of a pi… Ben Laurie
- Re: how many angels can dance on the head of a pi… Alex Bligh
- Re: how many angels can dance on the head of a pi… Ben Laurie
- Re: how many angels can dance on the head of a pi… Paul Vixie
- Re: how many angels can dance on the head of a pi… Paul Hoffman
- Re: how many angels can dance on the head of a pi… bmanning
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Havard Eidnes
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Mark Andrews
- DNSSEC on autopilot (was: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupt… Otmar Lendl
- Re: DNSSEC on autopilot (was: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC gr… Andrew Sullivan
- Re: DNSSEC on autopilot (was: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC gr… Otmar Lendl
- Re: DNSSEC on autopilot (was: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC gr… Mark Andrews
- Re: DNSSEC on autopilot (was: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC gr… Andrew Sullivan