Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving DNS
Havard Eidnes <he@uninett.no> Tue, 12 August 2008 14:47 UTC
Return-Path: <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
X-Original-To: ietfarch-dnsext-archive@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietfarch-dnsext-archive@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8D4523A6AB9; Tue, 12 Aug 2008 07:47:59 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -100.74
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-100.74 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_20=-0.74, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id yIw-ggpLG9-N; Tue, 12 Aug 2008 07:47:58 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from psg.com (psg.com [IPv6:2001:418:1::62]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 651DA3A68B9; Tue, 12 Aug 2008 07:47:58 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from majordom by psg.com with local (Exim 4.69 (FreeBSD)) (envelope-from <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>) id 1KSv3P-0007Wy-A2 for namedroppers-data@psg.com; Tue, 12 Aug 2008 14:40:55 +0000
Received: from [2001:700:1:0:211:9ff:fe8c:7386] (helo=smistad.uninett.no) by psg.com with esmtp (Exim 4.69 (FreeBSD)) (envelope-from <he@uninett.no>) id 1KSv3H-0007W3-EA for namedroppers@ops.ietf.org; Tue, 12 Aug 2008 14:40:52 +0000
Received: from smistad.uninett.no (smistad.uninett.no [158.38.62.77]) by smistad.uninett.no (Postfix) with ESMTP id DC51721DC44; Tue, 12 Aug 2008 16:40:48 +0200 (CEST)
Date: Tue, 12 Aug 2008 16:40:48 +0200
Message-Id: <20080812.164048.246546894.he@uninett.no>
To: lendl@nic.at
Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving DNS
From: Havard Eidnes <he@uninett.no>
In-Reply-To: <489C5202.4080405@nic.at>
References: <489B09FE.8050701@e164.org> <49451.1218124457@nsa.vix.com> <489C5202.4080405@nic.at>
X-Mailer: Mew version 5.2 on Emacs 22.1 / Mule 5.0 (SAKAKI)
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: Text/Plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Precedence: bulk
List-ID: <namedroppers.ops.ietf.org>
> * Are there any open protocol issues which make such a > "single checkbox" deployment of DNSSEC impossible? The need to communicate off-line or at least out-of-protocol with the parent zone administrator when you need to change/roll-over your KSKs -- this is probably what you meant by "automatic DS generation in the parent" in your next item. Although this might be seen as similar to making changes to the NS RRset, the initiative is triggered by a timer and not by administrator action, which is a considerable change from previous operational practice. There's also the issue of trust anchor maintenance, but that's being worked on, as I understand it. When reading some of the DNSSEC RFCs, I've sometimes come away with the understanding that the authors think that "zone administrators needs to sign the zone on an off-line machine to maintain a sufficiently high level of security". If I've understood correctly, that's completely at odds with the goal of having a fully automated feature with a checkbox for "maintain (generate and periodically roll) ZSKs and KSKs and sign and re-sign all my zones automatically". My guess is that only TLD and root zone maintainers would care enough about their zones and keys to bear the level of pain involved in implementing complete off-line signing ("zone transfer via sneakernet"). For a simple leaf zone master name server administrator, is there a good reason he needs to care more about his DNS private keys than about the protection and host security on the master name server (which might be "hidden", i.e. not in the NS set)? (OK, that probably wasn't a protocol issue...) Then there's the aspect of having the root signed, which is really needed in order to alleviate the pain of maintaining the trust anchors, a pain which is to be felt on all the recursive name servers who want to get the benefits of DNSSEC. Even if it appears to be a non-protocol issue does not make it any less important in the view of deployment. Best regards, - Håvard -- to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body. archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>
- Re: Additional filtering of responses Tony Finch
- Additional filtering of responses Wouter Wijngaards
- OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving DNS bert hubert
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Duane
- Re: Additional filtering of responses Paul Vixie
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Paul Vixie
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Paul Vixie
- RE: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Jesper G. Høy
- Re: Additional filtering of responses Roy Arends
- Re: Additional filtering of responses Paul Vixie
- Forgery resilience idea - wildcard cooperative de… Brian Dickson
- Re: Forgery resilience idea - wildcard cooperativ… Paul Vixie
- Re: Additional filtering of responses Roy Arends
- Re: Forgery resilience idea - wildcard cooperativ… bert hubert
- Re: Forgery resilience idea - wildcard cooperativ… Brian Dickson
- Re: Additional filtering of responses Edward Lewis
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Olaf Kolkman
- Re: Additional filtering of responses Tony Finch
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … David Conrad
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … bert hubert
- Re: Additional filtering of responses Edward Lewis
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Federico Lucifredi
- Re: Additional filtering of responses Paul Vixie
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Duane
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Mark Andrews
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Duane
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Duane
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Paul Vixie
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Paul Vixie
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Mark Andrews
- Re: Additional filtering of responses Mark Andrews
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Mark Andrews
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Duane
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Duane
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Duane
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Mark Andrews
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Duane
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Mark Andrews
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Duane
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Mark Andrews
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Duane
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Brian Dickson
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Mark Andrews
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Duane
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Duane
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Brian Dickson
- Re: Additional filtering of responses Masataka Ohta
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Duane
- Re: Additional filtering of responses Masataka Ohta
- Re: Additional filtering of responses Roy Arends
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Ralf Weber
- Re: Additional filtering of responses Masataka Ohta
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Duane at e164 dot org
- Re: Additional filtering of responses Duane at e164 dot org
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Ralf Weber
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Alex Bligh
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Duane at e164 dot org
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Duane at e164 dot org
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … sthaug
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … bert hubert
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Duane at e164 dot org
- Re: Additional filtering of responses Peter Koch
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Duane at e164 dot org
- Please stop this thread (was: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC gr… Andrew Sullivan
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Otmar Lendl
- Re: Please stop this thread (was: OFFTOPIC: DNSSE… Matt Larson
- Re: Please stop this thread (was: OFFTOPIC: DNSSE… David Conrad
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Ben Laurie
- how many angels can dance on the head of a pin? bmanning
- Re: how many angels can dance on the head of a pi… Duane at e164 dot org
- Re: how many angels can dance on the head of a pi… Alex Bligh
- Re: how many angels can dance on the head of a pi… Duane at e164 dot org
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Florian Weimer
- Re: how many angels can dance on the head of a pi… Alex Bligh
- Re: how many angels can dance on the head of a pi… Alex Bligh
- Re: how many angels can dance on the head of a pi… sthaug
- Re: how many angels can dance on the head of a pi… Ben Laurie
- Re: how many angels can dance on the head of a pi… Alex Bligh
- Re: how many angels can dance on the head of a pi… Ben Laurie
- Re: how many angels can dance on the head of a pi… Paul Vixie
- Re: how many angels can dance on the head of a pi… Paul Hoffman
- Re: how many angels can dance on the head of a pi… bmanning
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Havard Eidnes
- Re: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupthink versus improving … Mark Andrews
- DNSSEC on autopilot (was: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC groupt… Otmar Lendl
- Re: DNSSEC on autopilot (was: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC gr… Andrew Sullivan
- Re: DNSSEC on autopilot (was: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC gr… Otmar Lendl
- Re: DNSSEC on autopilot (was: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC gr… Mark Andrews
- Re: DNSSEC on autopilot (was: OFFTOPIC: DNSSEC gr… Andrew Sullivan