Re: [Doh] panel discussion on DoH/DoC

Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com> Thu, 07 February 2019 14:18 UTC

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From: Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com>
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Date: Thu, 7 Feb 2019 14:18:16 +0000
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To: Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>
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Subject: Re: [Doh] panel discussion on DoH/DoC
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> On 7 Feb 2019, at 14:04, Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com> wrote:
> 
> On Feb 7, 2019, at 8:51 AM, Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com> wrote:
>> These sorts of meta-issues need to be documented and I think this WG might be the best place to do that.
> 
> Doh?   Why not DPRIVE or DNSOP?

DoH’s more likely to have web clue than those two WGs. 

The DoH WG’s explictly chartered to analyse "the security and privacy issues that
could arise from accessing DNS over HTTPS.” DPRIVE and DNSOP are not.

I agree with you that a discussion is needed about where best to consider these DoH/DoC trust issues. Perhaps that can get some agenda time in Prague?