Re: [imss] imss WG Last Call: FC-SP MIB

Keith McCloghrie <kzm@cisco.com> Fri, 12 October 2007 03:52 UTC

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From: Keith McCloghrie <kzm@cisco.com>
Message-Id: <200710120351.UAA24389@cisco.com>
Subject: Re: [imss] imss WG Last Call: FC-SP MIB
To: Black_David@emc.com
Date: Thu, 11 Oct 2007 20:51:28 -0700
In-Reply-To: <no.id> from "Black_David@emc.com" at Oct 11, 2007 01:23:09 AM
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> ...
>
> > > (2) Section 4.9 defines rate control for Authentication
> > > 	failures on a per-fabric granularity.  That strikes
> > > 	me as overly coarse, and I wonder if per-SA would
> > > 	be a more appropriate/useful granularity.
> >  
> > I think the question here is whether it's likely that authentication
> > failures will occur on many SA's at the same time -- if it is likely,
> > then per-Fabric rate control allows for plenty of notifications in
> > isolated cases without getting overloaded when many SA's have the
> > problem.  But, if there's no correlation between occurrences on
> > different SA's, then the odds of many SA's having the problem at the
> > same time is presumably negligible, and I agree that per-SA would be
> > better.
> 
> I think this also revolves around the number of SAs.  I would expect
> FC-SP SA usage to be more akin to a site-to-site VPN (small number of
> SAs carrying large amounts of traffic) than a remote access VPN
> (large number of SAs carrying smaller amounts of traffic).  That
> should limit the size of a one-per-SA notification burst in practice.
> 
> I definitely agree with your concern about overload, as authentication
> failures are relatively cheap to generate (e.g., attacker need not do
> any crypto calculations), and hence causing a large number of such
> failures in a short time period could be a denial of service attack
> based on the work involved in generating the notifications.
> 
> OTOH, this text:
> 
>    For t11FcSpSaNotifyAuthFailure, rate control is achieved by
>    specifying that it is generated only for the first occurrence of an
>    Authentication failure on a particular Fabric within a time window.
> 
> strikes me as providing unwarranted help for an attacker trying
> to cover her tracks - she opens an SA to the victim, generates
> an authentication failure, thereby generating the first notification,
> and can then attack other SAs for the same fabric within the time
> window, since their notifications are suppressed.
> 
> Perhaps what's appropriate is a 2-level rate limiting structure:
> - At most one notification per SA in the (settable) time window.
> - At most <n> (new settable value) notifications per fabric in
> 	the same (settable) time window.

That sounds fine to me.

(FYI - I'm going to keep track of the changes we agree upon, and do all
the editing after the end of the Last Call.)

Keith.


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