Re: [perpass] Commnets on draft-farrell-perpass-attack-00 was RE: perens-perpass-appropriate-response-01
Stephane Bortzmeyer <bortzmeyer@nic.fr> Thu, 05 December 2013 09:41 UTC
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Date: Thu, 05 Dec 2013 10:40:28 +0100
From: Stephane Bortzmeyer <bortzmeyer@nic.fr>
To: Bruce Perens <bruce@perens.com>
Message-ID: <20131205094027.GA10388@nic.fr>
References: <290E20B455C66743BE178C5C84F1240847E5103799@EXMB01CMS.surrey.ac.uk> <2C66A416-5F07-4803-A4C0-BB61734BA42E@nominum.com> <529FB216.7010504@perens.com> <CAMm+Lwjyp2eiVyqujnxiad9+iqUjkbJDhshB3+g-8fWkwgc5Vg@mail.gmail.com> <529FBC5F.7050700@perens.com> <CAMm+LwhnL-q_y6652c9zLbQOHf2MtJstRcP=SjomB-bjPAgZ8w@mail.gmail.com> <ba1f6f7a-9a62-4ae8-b317-b9571bc79f0b@email.android.com>
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Cc: perpass <perpass@ietf.org>, Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [perpass] Commnets on draft-farrell-perpass-attack-00 was RE: perens-perpass-appropriate-response-01
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On Wed, Dec 04, 2013 at 09:18:52PM -0800, Bruce Perens <bruce@perens.com> wrote a message of 27 lines which said: > I don't think we can say for sure that TLS is any hurdle to NSA's > mass surveillance program at all. Besides obvious remarks (secret agencies are secret), what is the consequence to draw from this observation? That we should not use TLS because it is possible that NSA has successfully attacked it? If so, that would be a poor decision. First, there are other attackers, which do not have the same resources as the NSA. Second, even the NSA cannot break the law of physics (testing 2^256 possibilities take a lot of time, even when you have money). Third, since we don't know, it seems to me the reasonable thing to do would be to protect ourselves, just in case. [Insert here paranoid remarks about the NSA spreading the rumor that it can break TLS so people won't encrypt and therefore the NSA will not have to break TLS.]
- [perpass] Commnets on draft-farrell-perpass-attac… l.wood
- Re: [perpass] Commnets on draft-farrell-perpass-a… Ted Lemon
- Re: [perpass] Commnets on draft-farrell-perpass-a… Bruce Perens
- Re: [perpass] Commnets on draft-farrell-perpass-a… Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: [perpass] Commnets on draft-farrell-perpass-a… l.wood
- Re: [perpass] Commnets on draft-farrell-perpass-a… Ted Lemon
- Re: [perpass] Commnets on draft-farrell-perpass-a… Theodore Ts'o
- Re: [perpass] Commnets on draft-farrell-perpass-a… Hannes Tschofenig
- Re: [perpass] Commnets on draft-farrell-perpass-a… Bruce Perens
- Re: [perpass] Commnets on draft-farrell-perpass-a… Bruce Perens
- Re: [perpass] Commnets on draft-farrell-perpass-a… Mark Nottingham
- Re: [perpass] Commnets on draft-farrell-perpass-a… Bruce Perens
- Re: [perpass] Commnets on draft-farrell-perpass-a… Jacob Appelbaum
- Re: [perpass] Commnets on draft-farrell-perpass-a… Bruce Perens
- Re: [perpass] Commnets on draft-farrell-perpass-a… Jacob Appelbaum
- Re: [perpass] Commnets on draft-farrell-perpass-a… Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: [perpass] Commnets on draft-farrell-perpass-a… Bruce Perens
- Re: [perpass] Commnets on draft-farrell-perpass-a… Stephane Bortzmeyer
- Re: [perpass] Commnets on draft-farrell-perpass-a… Josh Howlett
- Re: [perpass] Commnets on draft-farrell-perpass-a… Stephen Farrell
- Re: [perpass] Commnets on draft-farrell-perpass-a… Josh Howlett
- Re: [perpass] Commnets on draft-farrell-perpass-a… Stephen Farrell
- Re: [perpass] Commnets on draft-farrell-perpass-a… Josh Howlett
- Re: [perpass] Commnets on draft-farrell-perpass-a… Stephen Farrell
- [perpass] Tiny stacks Brian E Carpenter
- Re: [perpass] Tiny stacks Richard Barnes
- Re: [perpass] Tiny stacks Robin Wilton
- Re: [perpass] Tiny stacks Paul Ferguson
- Re: [perpass] Tiny stacks Hannes Tschofenig
- [perpass] Way forward? [Was: Tiny stacks] Martin Millnert
- Re: [perpass] Tiny stacks Brian E Carpenter
- Re: [perpass] Tiny stacks Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: [perpass] Tiny stacks Richard Barnes
- Re: [perpass] Tiny stacks Martin Thomson
- Re: [perpass] Tiny stacks Stephen Farrell
- Re: [perpass] Tiny stacks Richard Barnes
- Re: [perpass] Tiny stacks Bjoern Hoehrmann
- Re: [perpass] Tiny stacks Richard Barnes
- Re: [perpass] Tiny stacks Stephen Farrell
- Re: [perpass] Tiny stacks Stephen Farrell
- Re: [perpass] Tiny stacks Brian E Carpenter
- Re: [perpass] Tiny stacks Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: [perpass] Tiny stacks Stephen Farrell
- Re: [perpass] Tiny stacks Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: [perpass] Tiny stacks Robin Wilton
- Re: [perpass] Tiny stacks Joseph Lorenzo Hall
- Re: [perpass] Tiny stacks Scott Brim
- Re: [perpass] Tiny stacks Scott Brim
- Re: [perpass] Tiny stacks Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: [perpass] Tiny stacks Dean Willis