Re: [perpass] Tiny stacks

Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> Tue, 10 December 2013 00:19 UTC

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Date: Tue, 10 Dec 2013 00:19:07 +0000
From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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To: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>, Bjoern Hoehrmann <derhoermi@gmx.net>
References: <290E20B455C66743BE178C5C84F1240847E510379D@EXMB01CMS.surrey.ac.uk> <52A4D7D9.9000603@cs.tcd.ie> <52A4E412.4030804@gmail.com> <72B86100-E73E-46BD-ABD6-8E35D56DBDDA@cisco.com> <52A61E4C.6020403@gmail.com> <52A62E98.2060705@gmx.net> <52A63CF9.7020303@gmail.com> <CAL02cgRYNNC7Emx=98a621PTPHDweLRTc=wjVhpRo-5yhVD=-Q@mail.gmail.com> <CABkgnnWX+=7Ui28RKNhN5_mwg9Sd3SbE1d4gvj7mUUXFO-ze3w@mail.gmail.com> <CAL02cgRs69O4NueRCBjea1tdCw5mXNUQcfNeZFhGN58HjS4dvQ@mail.gmail.com> <oskca9lv8fj2ijfb5cf1dhh03bnn7e0tv4@hive.bjoern.hoehrmann.de> <CAL02cgTM12r1WsdKE0Ngduf+uFB_inpseopaZ_FOgBCD5oMqeg@mail.gmail.com>
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Cc: perpass <perpass@ietf.org>, Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [perpass] Tiny stacks
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On 12/10/2013 12:07 AM, Richard Barnes wrote:
> On Mon, Dec 9, 2013 at 6:46 PM, Bjoern Hoehrmann <derhoermi@gmx.net> wrote:
> 
>> * Richard Barnes wrote:
>>> I'm thinking of things like these...
>>
>>> <http://bgr.com/2013/11/20/lg-smart-tv-spying/>
>>>
>>> ... which do not seem like RFC-able things (so, the latter).  Both are
>> poor
>>> design decisions; the first not applying authentication/authorization, and
>>> the second, well, just epically failing. What are you going to do, require
>>> someone to set a jumper for DNT?
>>
>>   An LG Smart TV owner in the United Kingdom has shockingly discovered
>>   that his device is sending unencrypted data over Wi-Fi containing TV
>>   watching habits, as well as file names from external storage units
>>   hooked up to the TV to an LG website, even though the TV’s privacy
>>   settings should have prevented such behavior.
>>
>> Next device this data will be sent encrypted, with the keys and the
>> software secured by the TV's "DRM" system so Smart TV owners will no
>> longer be able to find out about such problems.
>>
> 
> That actually seems like kind of a compelling rationale for
> authentication-only modes (as Bruce suggested) -- so we the network owners
> can see what our devices are doing.  It's isomorphic to the enterprise
> case, but a little more intuitive for we end users.

I disagree. As Bjorn says the device manuf will encrypt
next time no doubt irrespective of whatever HTTP does,
perhaps using the JS WebCrypto API;-)

May as well encrypt the HTTP then since you'll need to
spot the badness via traffic analysis yourself! (Only
kidding, the always-encrypt-HTTP argument isn't that
simple and should be rehashed here:-)

But yes, the privacy-unfriendly behaviour of our devices
and service providers is a major deal. I don't think that
justifies arguments to give up our privacy to everyone in
between though.

S

> 
> --Richard
> 
> 
> 
>> --
>> Björn Höhrmann · mailto:bjoern@hoehrmann.de · http://bjoern.hoehrmann.de
>> Am Badedeich 7 · Telefon: +49(0)160/4415681 · http://www.bjoernsworld.de
>> 25899 Dagebüll · PGP Pub. KeyID: 0xA4357E78 · http://www.websitedev.de/
>>
> 
> 
> 
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