[saag] Re: New Version Notification for draft-rsalz-crypto-registries-00.txt

Paul Wouters <paul.wouters@aiven.io> Thu, 28 November 2024 22:58 UTC

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From: Paul Wouters <paul.wouters@aiven.io>
Date: Thu, 28 Nov 2024 17:57:59 -0500
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To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
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Subject: [saag] Re: New Version Notification for draft-rsalz-crypto-registries-00.txt
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On Thu, Nov 28, 2024 at 4:32 PM Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote:

>
>> Maybe, but Peter's complaint is that OpenSSH sets defacto "standards"
>>
>
> As opposed to?
>

IKEv2 and IPsec with RFC 8221/8284 provides recommendations for
implementers that usually translate with some delay to defaults.

TLS with RECOMMENDED  provides recommendations for implementers that
usually translate with some delay to defaults. Such as recommending only
AEADs for TLS 1.2, not using 1.0/1.1, etc.

OpenPGP RFC 8590 recommending which algorithms to no longer use for new
encryption (and keep support for old algos to be able to read old encrypred
files/email)

DNSSEC recommends algorithms via RFC 8624, separate for signing/producing
and verifying/consuming to provide for facilitating a long tail. This took
some time and discussion because people did have different opinions (eg it
was decided SHA1 couldn't be fully kicked at the time because it was still
too much in use)

For SSH we never had that because the SSH community and the IETF broke
apart in the 90s. Now with the SSHM WG we are trying to amend that, which I
guess comes with difficulties and 20 years of fork'ed opinions.


> If you want running code out there that's what happens
>

I don't understand this sentence. We have plenty of running code with
options not dictated by one implementation.

Paul