Re: [stir] Review of: draft-ietf-stir-passport-05

The realization below also necessitates changes to the first sentence of the abstract and a scrub of the body of the document wrt  to verifying the originating identity.  This verification is optional.  

Regards,

Alex

> -----Original Message-----
> From: stir [mailto:stir-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Chris Wendt
> Sent: Monday, August 29, 2016 11:52 AM
> To: Dave Crocker <dcrocker@bbiw.net>
> Cc: stir@ietf.org; Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
> Subject: Re: [stir] Review of: draft-ietf-stir-passport-05
> 
> Agree, will remove term "non-repudiation", discussed this in ATIS Task Force
> and came to realization that we are looking at the Passport representing
> purely an assertion of the identity and the signer is the party responsible for
> that assertion, and "buyer beware".
> 
> 
> > On Aug 27, 2016, at 8:07 PM, Dave Crocker <dcrocker@bbiw.net> wrote:
> >
> > On 8/27/2016 4:52 PM, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >> On Sat, Aug 27, 2016 at 2:40 PM, Dave Crocker <dhc@dcrocker.net
> >> <mailto:dhc@dcrocker.net>> wrote:
> >
> >>
> >>            Is the timestamp the basis of claiming non-repudiation?
> >>
> >>
> >>        Partially, depending on your interpretation of how
> >>        non-repudiation is
> >>        achieved.  The digital signature based on a certificate is the
> >>        non-repudiation of the original assertion and signing of the token.
> >>
> >>
> >>    That seems to equate authentication with non-reputation of
> >>    originator. But they aren't the same.
> >>
> >>
> >> Do you mean "non-repudiation" here? I ask because "reputation" is
> >> also a concept potentially in play here.
> >
> > I'm using 'non-repudiation' because the spec uses that term.
> >
> > If the spec really means 'reputation', that opens a different set of concerns,
> since nothing in any of the 3 documents has to do with reputation, per se.
> >
> >
> >> I think it would probably be fine to remove the term "non-repudiation"
> >> from this spec, since it only appears in the abstract. Generally,
> >> it's not that useful a concept for most security settings, especially
> >> when one starts to ask questions about the legal context.
> >>
> >> With that said, given that these tokens are signed by their creator
> >> and there is a timestamp to provide anti-replay, there is at least
> >> potentially an important technical property being provided here,
> >> which is that in the case where a passport creator signs a bogus
> >> passport, it is possible to demonstrate that it did so, which is not
> >> a property necessarily provided by authentication systems.
> >
> > And I believe that was my original guess, although my very limited
> understanding of non-repudiation includes the significant burden of having
> the timestamp, itself, be validated by an independent authority. Otherwise,
> the signer could claim any time they want to...
> >
> > d/
> >
> >
> > --
> >
> >  Dave Crocker
> >  Brandenburg InternetWorking
> >  bbiw.net
> 
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