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Re: [Add] Proposed charter and BoF request for IETF 106

Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Wed, 09 October 2019 18:32 UTC

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Wed, 09 Oct 2019 11:32:02 -0700
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To: tirumal reddy <kondtir@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>, ADD Mailing list <add@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Add] Proposed charter and BoF request for IETF 106
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On Wed, Oct 9, 2019 at 11:04 AM tirumal reddy <kondtir@gmail.com> wrote:

> On Wed, 9 Oct 2019 at 18:15, Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> wrote:
>
>> On Wed, 9 Oct 2019, Eric Rescorla wrote:
>>
>> > You're misunderstanding me. I'm not saying that we should not enable
>> network operators to shift to encrypted transport.
>> > As I said in the section of my message that you cut, I'm more than
>> happy to have the IETF standardize a mechanism for
>> > the network to tell endpoints that it supports encrypted transport. I'm
>> merely observing that this does not address the
>> > issue that Mozilla is trying to address with our DoH/TRR deployment.
>>
>> And it seems doing this at the DHCP / Captive Portal level is enough. I
>> don't see the need for a WG to be spun up for this.
>>
>
> DHCP is not a secure way to discover the local DoT/DoH server.
>

It would probably useful to start by defining what "secure" means in this
context. For instance, I am in an airport and I see the name of the WiFi AP
printed on the wall an join a network with that SSID. How would you define
securely learning the DoH server?

-Ekr


> -Tiru
>
>
>>
>> Paul
>>
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>>
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