Re: [Add] Proposed charter and BoF request for IETF 106

Vittorio Bertola <vittorio.bertola@open-xchange.com> Wed, 09 October 2019 16:56 UTC

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Date: Wed, 09 Oct 2019 18:56:31 +0200
From: Vittorio Bertola <vittorio.bertola@open-xchange.com>
Reply-To: Vittorio Bertola <vittorio.bertola@open-xchange.com>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Cc: ADD Mailing list <add@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Add] Proposed charter and BoF request for IETF 106
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Il 9 ottobre 2019 13:58 Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> ha scritto:

> Achieving these
> objectives while providing confidentiality and tamper-resistance will
> generally require that network operators shift to one of the available
> encrypted transports for their resolvers and that clients include
> configuration options to select them.

This entirely misses the point, which isn't just to do a lot of encryption
but to provide security for the user. Just having network operators
transition to secure transports while continuing their current practices
does not address the issue.
Sorry, now it is my turn to dot the i's: certainly *some* network operators in your country adopt *some* current practices that Mozilla do not like, and neither do I. But you cannot generalize this like that, and then use it as a reason not to enable the other network operators to shift to encrypted transport while continuing their practices exactly like they are, for the full satisfaction of their existing users.

And by the way, making judgements on whether the commercial practices of a given company are acceptable really looks like a policy issue.

--
Vittorio Bertola | Head of Policy & Innovation, Open-Xchange
vittorio.bertola@open-xchange.com
Office @ Via Treviso 12, 10144 Torino, Italy