Re: [Add] Proposed charter and BoF request for IETF 106

tirumal reddy <kondtir@gmail.com> Thu, 10 October 2019 15:51 UTC

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From: tirumal reddy <kondtir@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2019 16:51:41 +0100
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To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Cc: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>, ADD Mailing list <add@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Add] Proposed charter and BoF request for IETF 106
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On Wed, 9 Oct 2019 at 19:32, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:

>
>
> On Wed, Oct 9, 2019 at 11:04 AM tirumal reddy <kondtir@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> On Wed, 9 Oct 2019 at 18:15, Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> wrote:
>>
>>> On Wed, 9 Oct 2019, Eric Rescorla wrote:
>>>
>>> > You're misunderstanding me. I'm not saying that we should not enable
>>> network operators to shift to encrypted transport.
>>> > As I said in the section of my message that you cut, I'm more than
>>> happy to have the IETF standardize a mechanism for
>>> > the network to tell endpoints that it supports encrypted transport.
>>> I'm merely observing that this does not address the
>>> > issue that Mozilla is trying to address with our DoH/TRR deployment.
>>>
>>> And it seems doing this at the DHCP / Captive Portal level is enough. I
>>> don't see the need for a WG to be spun up for this.
>>>
>>
>> DHCP is not a secure way to discover the local DoT/DoH server.
>>
>
> It would probably useful to start by defining what "secure" means in this
> context.
>

"secure" means only the operator of the network should be able to advertise
the  DoT/DoH server. If DHCP is used, attacker can spoof the DHCP response.


> For instance, I am in an airport and I see the name of the WiFi AP printed
> on the wall an join a network with that SSID. How would you define securely
> learning the DoH server?
>

The user cannot know the SSID is hosted by the airport IT admin or by an
attacker in the first place. I don't think the charter of the WG is
targeted only for public WiFi, local resolver discovery is critical in
Home, Mobile and Enterprise networks to meet some of the issues raised in
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-reid-doh-operator-00.

-Tiru


>
> -Ekr
>
>
>> -Tiru
>>
>>
>>>
>>> Paul
>>>
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>>>
>> --
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>>
>