Re: [Ntp] NTP Security (was NTPv5: big picture)

Miroslav Lichvar <mlichvar@redhat.com> Wed, 20 January 2021 09:07 UTC

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Date: Wed, 20 Jan 2021 10:07:15 +0100
From: Miroslav Lichvar <mlichvar@redhat.com>
To: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Cc: ntp@ietf.org, Magnus Danielson <magnus@rubidium.se>
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Subject: Re: [Ntp] NTP Security (was NTPv5: big picture)
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On Tue, Jan 19, 2021 at 06:48:45PM +0100, Kurt Roeckx wrote:
> I agree that you can't combine two things that are not validated
> and end up with something that's validated. But everything really
> is about probabilities and amount of work needed to break it. The
> more keys that need to be compromised before you accept something
> wrong, the more unlikely it is. I think it's really up to the
> users to decide what is an acceptable risk.

Ok, as long as it is clear that the proposed mechanism for
bootstrapping time it is not supposed to be secure (in threat models
commonly assumed with DNSSEC and TLS), just more difficult to be
exploited, I have no problem with that.

There are other recommendations that could be made if you cannot
perform the certificate time check using a trusted time source, which
might be easier to implement, e.g. require multiple independent NTS
sources.

-- 
Miroslav Lichvar