Re: [Ntp] NTP Security (was NTPv5: big picture)

Magnus Danielson <magnus@rubidium.se> Tue, 19 January 2021 16:50 UTC

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From: Magnus Danielson <magnus@rubidium.se>
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Date: Tue, 19 Jan 2021 17:50:20 +0100
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Subject: Re: [Ntp] NTP Security (was NTPv5: big picture)
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On 2021-01-19 14:51, Miroslav Lichvar wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 19, 2021 at 01:15:57PM +0000, FUSTE Emmanuel wrote:
>> Le 19/01/2021 à 14:04, Miroslav Lichvar a écrit :
>>> In this process you have only verified consistency of the time and
>>> other data you have received. It was valid some time ago, but it may
>>> not be valid now. If the attacker captured all that data, it can be
>>> reused later in a MITM attack.
>> How ???
>> - If it replay my DNS data fine, it will do the work of my DNS servers 
>> for me as he could not resign.
>> - For the NTS part you are saying that TLS and NTS are subject to MITM 
>> attacks ?
> Yes, the attacker has the old private key.
What? How did the attacker get the private keys? How did the attacker
fool that system? So, what references for this attack do you have?
>
> The assumption is that both your DNSSEC and NTS was compromised at
> some point. You found out and rebuilt your infrastructure from
> scratch, but the attacker can still perform a MITM attack on your
> device if it doesn't know the current date in order to validate the
> certificate/records.
>
Outside of our scope. Way outside. We assume we can trust whatever these
mechanisms provide and our trust becomes tied to them. If you have ways
to attack that, this is not really the place to document those.

Cheers,
Magnus