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Re: [sidr] WGLC draft-sidr-rpki-rtr - take 2?

Uma Chunduri <uma.chunduri@ericsson.com> Fri, 03 June 2011 21:28 UTC

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From: Uma Chunduri <uma.chunduri@ericsson.com>
To: Sandra Murphy <Sandra.Murphy@sparta.com>
Date: Fri, 03 Jun 2011 17:28:27 -0400
Thread-Topic: [sidr] WGLC draft-sidr-rpki-rtr - take 2?
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Cc: "stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie" <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>, "sidr@ietf.org" <sidr@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [sidr] WGLC draft-sidr-rpki-rtr - take 2?
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-----Original Message-----
From: Sandra Murphy [mailto:Sandra.Murphy@sparta.com] 
Sent: Friday, June 03, 2011 1:43 PM
To: Uma Chunduri
Cc: sidr@ietf.org; Sean Turner; stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie
Subject: Re: [sidr] WGLC draft-sidr-rpki-rtr - take 2?


On Fri, 3 Jun 2011, Uma Chunduri wrote:

>
>
....

>
> True, privacy through SSH is overkill but strong AUTH is *critical*, I feel:
>   - TCP-MD5 should not be considered (as it is any ways deprecated and it's MD5)
>   - TCP-AO has only slight advantage as it has less overhead than ipsec-AH even when
>     deployed with manual keys
>   - but it's better if it is "MUST support authentication of nodes 
> with TCP-AO or ipsec-AH" because

Just to be sure:

Did you understand the part about implementations of TCP-AO and ipsec-AH not being available at present?

I.e., you recognize this forces a delay in implementation of the protocol (and accept the consequent impact on deployment of the RPKI)?

[Uma] Yes, I did. Even though operators don't like  ipsec-AH today, it is still deployed for OSPFv3 protection as that 
(of course now there are other drafts to mitigate complexity with reasonable trade-off).

Problem with MD5 is, it can present the *weakest* link for the whole RPKI infa.
At least new infrastructure like RPKI should avoid deprecated  stuff.

-Uma


--Sandy, speaking as wg co-chair


>     as both support
>           - strong auth algos
>           - algo agility
>           - can be deployed with manual and auto key management
>            (auto key probably required eventually, once with lot of connections at
>             cache/global RPKI/server side and for automatic key
>             changes periodically)
>           - key changes for existing sessions
>
>    One would get flexibility with this.
>    Also Section 7 (page 16)
>    "It is assumed that the router and cache have exchanged keys out of band by some reasonably secured means"
>    This will be still applicable but only if TCP-AO/ipsce-AH are deployed with manual keys.
>
> 2 cents,
> -Uma
>
>
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