Re: [sidr] WGLC draft-sidr-rpki-rtr - take 2?

[Christopher Morrow <[e-mail]>]

On Fri, Jun 3, 2011 at 5:33 PM, Uma Chunduri <[e-mail]> wrote:
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: John Scudder [mailto:[e-mail]]
> Sent: Friday, June 03, 2011 1:53 PM
> To: Uma Chunduri
> Cc: Christopher Morrow; [e-mail]; [e-mail]; Sean Turner; [e-mail]; Rob Austein
> Subject: Re: [sidr] WGLC draft-sidr-rpki-rtr - take 2?
>
> On Jun 3, 2011, at 4:23 PM, Uma Chunduri wrote:
>> True, privacy through SSH is overkill but strong AUTH is *critical*, I feel:
>>   - TCP-MD5 should not be considered (as it is any ways deprecated and
>> it's MD5)
>
> What specifically do you mean by "should not be considered"?
>
> [Uma] I responded in other e-mail. No protection is better than weak protection.

to keep the thread clear: "Define Weak"

-chris
<co-chair-bangle-bracelent==on>

>>   - TCP-AO has only slight advantage as it has less overhead than ipsec-AH even when
>>     deployed with manual keys
>>   - but it's better if it is "MUST support authentication of nodes
>> with TCP-AO or ipsec-AH" because
>
> The drawback of saying "MUST support A or B" is that two implementations may be formally compliant yet not interoperable.  That would obviously be undesirable (to say the least).  IMO the spec should pick one mandatory one while leaving open the option to support others.
>
> [Uma] True. Then probably TCP-AO. But ipsec-AH can give tough challenge as it's relatively
>     old and more readily available than AO (also understood better as it is already deployed
>     else where).
> -Uma
>
> --John