Re: [sidr] WGLC draft-sidr-rpki-rtr - take 2?

[Randy Bush <[e-mail]>]

>> suspect that they will span the Internet, ie totally different to an
>> IDR session.  And that suggests that anyone anywhere can attack them,
>> so I would expect to see a threat analysis and counters thereto.
> interesting, Randy does this seem like something that you were
> thinking of as well? or since the intent is to do this sort of thing
> inside a single ASN (or single administrative domain) is this
> something that's less critical?

the recommendations in draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops would seem to be
useful here.  for example

   As RPKI-based origin validation relies on the availability of RPKI
   data, operators SHOULD locate caches close to routers that require
   these data and services.  A router can peer with one or more nearby
   caches.

randy