Re: [dmarc-ietf] Proposed text for p=reject and indirect mail flows

Douglas Foster <dougfoster.emailstandards@gmail.com> Sat, 08 April 2023 21:27 UTC

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From: Douglas Foster <dougfoster.emailstandards@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 08 Apr 2023 17:27:26 -0400
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To: IETF DMARC WG <dmarc@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [dmarc-ietf] Proposed text for p=reject and indirect mail flows
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I rather thought all of the recent discussion is on the general topic of
what to do about mailing lists, and that we were still a long ways from
consensus, as we were three years ago.

For my part, I have a hard time accepting the concept that there are
meaningful distinctions between high, medium, and low value targets.
 Malicious impersonation is a problem, regardless of the domain used for
that purpose.   Which domain is useful to the spammer depends on who he is
attacking at the moment, and everyone gets attacked.

I also have a hard time with the notion that any domain with a potential
exception becomes a domain that MUST NOT protect itself from
impersonation.  It seems like essentially every domain has a potential
exception, so this becomes a directive to warn people away from DMARC
completely.   Some participants would doubtless like that outcome, but I
don't see any likelihood that DMARC can be killed.

Email delivery is the digital version of a stare-down contest.   Evaluators
have a take-it-or-leave-it choice on every message.   We don't have the
option of asking, "Can you provide a little more information here?   Can I
see your identity card?   Can you explain the purpose of this message?"
 Similarly, the sender launches messages into the wild hoping that they
will actually be delivered, and sometimes working furiously to figure out
if that actually happened.   If his message is blocked, he has few if any
way to ask for reconsideration.   In the current situation, AOL has won the
stare-down contest, because they refuse to blink.   We need to figure out
how to make messages acceptable to them, and abandon hope of getting them
to change.   If they were interested in changing, they might make an
occasional contribution to this list so that we would know what would be
acceptable to them.,

In my world, when an employee thinks a message was blocked incorrectly, he
complains, we investigate, and we make adjustments.   For some recipients,
this process apparently breaks down.   We seem to assume that if the sender
adds one or more additional layers of complexity, this breakdown between
evaluator and domain member can be prevented by outside action.   I am
skeptical that it will be that easy.

Mailing lists have some unique problems.   They have messages from multiple
author domains being transmitted to multiple recipient domains.   Since
every domain has unique filtering rules, it is predictable that the list
will have a continuing series of problems with a subset of messages being
blocked by a subset of evaluators.   RBLs are one way this can happen -
different domains reference different RBLs, so a sender may be blocked
(correctly or incorrectly) and rejected by evaluators using one RBL, but
allowed by evaluators using another RBL.

Even when the recipient and the evaluator have a great working
relationship, neither party may understand what exceptions are needed for
the messages from every participant, current or future, to be accepted
reliably.   So the list messages arrive smoothly until a message is sent
from a participant in a geo-blocked country.    The user discovers the
problem when he realizes that he has no idea what topic is being discussed,
because he missed the initial post.   t seems evident that to get
consistent evaluation results, evaluators need to judge based on the list
identity and reputation, rather than the sender identity and reputation.
 I do not see how this can be achieved without replacing the From address
with an address in the list domain.   Replacing the From address is not the
only obstacle, but it is the starting point.

Doug Foster



On Sat, Apr 8, 2023 at 4:17 PM Scott Kitterman <sklist@kitterman.com> wrote:

> We've gone nearly a week without any further discussion on this thread.
>
> I reviewed the thread and I think this is the closest we got to anything
> (most) people agreed on.  I know not everyone liked it, but I doubt we're
> going to get closer to a consensus on this.
>
> Can we adopt this and move forward on to the next thing?
>
> Scott K
>
> On Wednesday, March 29, 2023 7:42:49 PM EDT Barry Leiba wrote:
> > I'm happy with that suggestion.
> >
> > Barry
> >
> > On Thu, Mar 30, 2023 at 6:00 AM Scott Kitterman <sklist@kitterman.com>
> wrote:
> > > Would you feel any better if the MUST NOT was followed by 'to preserve
> > > interoperability '?  That's implicitly there and I believe technically
> > > correct.  If you value other properties of the system higher than
> > > interoperability, then the advice may not apply, which is fine.
> > >
> > > Scott K
> > >
> > > On March 29, 2023 3:32:10 PM UTC, "Brotman, Alex"
> <Alex_Brotman=40comcast.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
> > > >I’m just not sure how we determine what is high-value.
> > > >
> > > >comcast.com: p=reject
> > > >comcast.net: p=none
> > > >xfinity.com: p=quarantine
> > > >
> > > >The top one is corporate, middle is consumer, bottom is consumer (but
> not
> > > >actually used) & customer comms (sub-domains).  They’re all used in
> > > >various ways for internal messaging.  Should I tell our corporate
> admins
> > > >that they need to no longer publish p=reject?  They’re violating the
> RFC
> > > >by doing so?  There are very few consumer-oriented messages that
> > > >originate from comcast.com.  Are we doing it right?  It makes things
> a
> > > >little harder when one of our employees wants to use a mailing list.
> > > >But that still feels like the right thing to do.
> > > >
> > > >If it’s not obvious, I’m having a hard time with “MUST NOT”, and
> > > >dictating to domain owners what is in their best interests, regardless
> > > >of our perceived value of their domain.
> > > >
> > > >--
> > > >Alex Brotman
> > > >Sr. Engineer, Anti-Abuse & Messaging Policy
> > > >Comcast
> > > >
> > > >From: dmarc <dmarc-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Barry Leiba
> > > >Sent: Wednesday, March 29, 2023 10:15 AM
> > > >To: Todd Herr <todd.herr=40valimail.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
> > > >Cc: dmarc@ietf.org
> > > >Subject: Re: [dmarc-ietf] Proposed text for p=reject and indirect mail
> > > >flows
> > > >
> > > >I'm very much against text such as this, as I think it encourages
> > > >deployments that are contrary to interoperability and to the intent of
> > > >p=reject.
> > > >
> > > >I contend that p=reject (as with the similar construct in the older
> ADSP)
> > > >was intended for high-value domains and transactional mail, and that
> it
> > > >was never intended for use in domains where general users send general
> > > >email.
> > > >
> > > >I stand by the MUST NOT that I proposed.
> > > >
> > > >Barry
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >On Wed, Mar 29, 2023 at 10:33 PM Todd Herr
> > > ><todd.herr=40valimail.com@dmarc.ietf.org<mailto:
> 40valimail.com@dmarc.iet
> > > >f.org>> wrote: On Tue, Mar 28, 2023 at 9:06 PM Pete Resnick
> > > ><resnick@episteme.net<mailto:resnick@episteme.net>> wrote:
> > > >
> > > >If you agree that interoperability is increased, then I'd suggest that
> > > >you actually do agree that the proposed text is appropriate.
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >I don't know that I agree that interoperability is increased...
> > > >
> > > >I'm having trouble squaring proposed language that says "Domain owners
> > > >MUST NOT publish p=reject because it breaks interoperability" with the
> > > >following language from section 5.8:
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >Mail Receivers **MAY** choose to accept email that fails the DMARC
> > > >
> > > >mechanism check even if the published Domain Owner Assessment Policy
> > > >
> > > >is "reject". In particular, because of the considerations discussed
> > > >
> > > >in [@!RFC7960], it is important that Mail Receivers **SHOULD NOT**
> reject
> > > >
> > > >messages solely because of a published policy of "reject", but that
> > > >
> > > >they apply other knowledge and analysis to avoid situations such as
> > > >
> > > >rejection of legitimate messages sent in ways that DMARC cannot
> > > >describe, harm to the operation of mailing lists, and similar.
> > > >
> > > >It seems inconsistent to state with certainty that authorized mail
> will
> > > >be rejected due to authentication breakage when there is no
> requirement
> > > >that a reject policy be honored (and we have plenty of evidence that
> > > >Mail Receivers are following the 'SHOULD NOT reject messages'
> guidance).
> > > >
> > > >Language that would be more consistent in guidance to the domain
> owners
> > > >might look something like this:
> > > >
> > > >After careful analysis of the aggregate report data as described in
> > > >section 5.5.5 (Collect and Analyze Reports), Domain Owners **MAY**
> > > >choose to change their policy from 'none' to 'quarantine' or 'reject'.
> > > >If, in the Domain Owner's judgement, unauthorized and deceptive use of
> > > >its domain name in the RFC5322.From field puts at risk the trust it
> has
> > > >built with its recipients, then it is **RECOMMENDED** that the Domain
> > > >Owner make use of the p and/or sp tags to set policy to 'quarantine'
> or
> > > >'reject' for those streams most at risk of loss of trust.
> > > >
> > > >If going that route, probably want to consider expanding on 5.5.5,
> too; I
> > > >need to think about it some more.
>
>
>
>
>
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