Re: [dmarc-ietf] Proposed text for p=reject and indirect mail flows

Scott Kitterman <sklist@kitterman.com> Tue, 28 March 2023 16:18 UTC

Return-Path: <sklist@kitterman.com>
X-Original-To: dmarc@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: dmarc@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 60739C1524AE for <dmarc@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 28 Mar 2023 09:18:23 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -4.398
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.398 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, RCVD_IN_ZEN_BLOCKED_OPENDNS=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_DBL_BLOCKED_OPENDNS=0.001, URIBL_ZEN_BLOCKED_OPENDNS=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=neutral reason="invalid (unsupported algorithm ed25519-sha256)" header.d=kitterman.com header.b="NbUUHprl"; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kitterman.com header.b="SCZafZGg"
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([50.223.129.194]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 1OA7fhxOjC8w for <dmarc@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 28 Mar 2023 09:18:19 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from interserver.kitterman.com (interserver.kitterman.com [IPv6:2604:a00:6:1039:225:90ff:feaa:b169]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (2048 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4A1B9C151B0E for <dmarc@ietf.org>; Tue, 28 Mar 2023 09:18:19 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from interserver.kitterman.com (interserver.kitterman.com [64.20.48.66]) by interserver.kitterman.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5410BF802F1 for <dmarc@ietf.org>; Tue, 28 Mar 2023 12:18:06 -0400 (EDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=ed25519-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kitterman.com; i=@kitterman.com; q=dns/txt; s=201903e; t=1680020271; h=from : to : subject : date : message-id : in-reply-to : references : mime-version : content-transfer-encoding : content-type : from; bh=f5Hofk0stz+D7p0IbvjSuZFIbE6SwD7lXm85VQrN694=; b=NbUUHprlKhKjJQwg4bpYw+Y658HUJHRbnYd9A9U7/gLDTs0avLWWGLuGsA4aB6O15RMWO bPEddkQ6mKzA2NvDg==
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kitterman.com; i=@kitterman.com; q=dns/txt; s=201903r; t=1680020271; h=from : to : subject : date : message-id : in-reply-to : references : mime-version : content-transfer-encoding : content-type : from; bh=f5Hofk0stz+D7p0IbvjSuZFIbE6SwD7lXm85VQrN694=; b=SCZafZGghoK+uqPfg8gD2OZSxMgYt26J+FoztfsSl+iEyUMJ7HlLn5b33CmmhCFXcBGr8 cmMvV7QugUyDWsxBuee25hdQnrEmD0d5iWh7CxDuCNsLvwKHgPvw+aeoa6WBM3KMX237XBT E9Dj8mbu8Dsv2pqvPrSi4kBy0hDKE/ooj5W+f+1GaSMf7s98+MBYgcPRuixdVqAv54mk+0Y QQil3ibz30+iNDKMfW9NFMpEl9TMLo2wuWvPIXsdiuRhaZiZDuvLjvBaVAmQG9S/MWcfhQq kkOC7TfaTgSoJ2l7nsTq9CvS1Mxiad/hUhXRvU9wvpU/NslYZ4Xzv3qwPKAA==
Received: from localhost.localnet (static-72-81-252-22.bltmmd.fios.verizon.net [72.81.252.22]) by interserver.kitterman.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 39DA9F801D5 for <dmarc@ietf.org>; Tue, 28 Mar 2023 12:17:51 -0400 (EDT)
From: Scott Kitterman <sklist@kitterman.com>
To: dmarc@ietf.org
Date: Tue, 28 Mar 2023 12:17:46 -0400
Message-ID: <3445610.T9FX6QkNB4@localhost>
In-Reply-To: <CAHej_8nu8LZCEk2COCk6XUv9oPs2tP-SOZfUhKSqMxx8gBN8iA@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CALaySJ+NBg9vzqa0_t-sBf7EKXQ3A=DTyy-Vc7M-ZK9-vfJxmw@mail.gmail.com> <CAHej_8m7m29EiKUzarR1wBVyxfORfdcX_kgUz0-3uDiqoZ+i2A@mail.gmail.com> <CAHej_8nu8LZCEk2COCk6XUv9oPs2tP-SOZfUhKSqMxx8gBN8iA@mail.gmail.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/dmarc/knwuvxfbQFfPkHmNvA91vP8n9ys>
Subject: Re: [dmarc-ietf] Proposed text for p=reject and indirect mail flows
X-BeenThere: dmarc@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.39
Precedence: list
List-Id: "Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Compliance \(DMARC\)" <dmarc.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/dmarc>, <mailto:dmarc-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/dmarc/>
List-Post: <mailto:dmarc@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:dmarc-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dmarc>, <mailto:dmarc-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 28 Mar 2023 16:18:23 -0000

On Tuesday, March 28, 2023 11:58:40 AM EDT Todd Herr wrote:
> Upon further reflection, I find myself liking Barry's proposed text less,
> and instead propose the following:
> 
> On Tue, Mar 28, 2023 at 9:42 AM Todd Herr <todd.herr@valimail.com> wrote:
> > On 28 Mar 2023, at 17:15, Barry Leiba wrote:
> >> > NEW
> >> > 
> >> >    5.5.6.  Decide If and When to Update DMARC Policy
> >> >    
> >> >    Once the Domain Owner is satisfied that it is properly
> >> >    authenticating
> >> >    all of its mail, then it is time to decide if it is appropriate to
> >> >    change the p= value in its DMARC record to p=quarantine or p=reject.
> >> >    Depending on its cadence for sending mail, it may take many months
> >> >    of
> >> >    consuming DMARC aggregate reports before a Domain Owner reaches the
> >> >    point where it is sure that it is properly authenticating all of its
> >> >    mail, and the decision on which p= value to use will depend on its
> >> >    needs.
> >> >    
> >> >    It is important to understand that many domains may never use
> >> >    policies of “quarantine” or “reject”, and that these policies are
> >> >    intended not as goals, but as policies available for use when they
> >> >    are appropriate.  In particular, “reject” is not intended for
> >> >    deployment in domains with users who send routine email, and its
> >> >    deployment in such domains can disrupt indirect mail flows and cause
> >> >    damage to operation of mailing lists and other forwarding services.
> >> >    This is discussed in [RFC7960] and in Section 5.8, below.  The
> >> >    “reject” policy is best reserved for domains that send only
> >> >    transactional email that is not intended to be posted to mailing
> >> >    lists.
> > >    
> > >    To be explicitly clear: domains used for general-purpose email MUST
> > >    
> >> >    NOT deploy a DMARC policy of p=reject.
> 
> NEW
> 
> 5.5.6 Decide Whether to Update DMARC Policy
> 
> Once the Domain Owner is satisfied that it is properly authenticating
> 
> all of its mail, then it is time to decide if it is appropriate to
> 
> change the p= value in its DMARC record to p=quarantine or p=reject.
> 
> Depending on its cadence for sending mail, it may take many months
> 
> of consuming DMARC aggregate reports before a Domain Owner reaches
> 
> the point where it is sure that it is properly authenticating all
> 
> of its mail, and the decision on which p= value to use will depend
> on its needs.
> 
> The policies "reject" and "quarantine" are more effective than "none" for
> accomplishing the chief goal of DMARC, namely to stop the exact-domain
> spoofing of the domain in the RFC5322.From header. However, experience
> has shown that a policy of "reject" can result in the disruption of
> indirect mail
> flows and cause damage to the operation of mailing lists and other
> forwarding
> services; [@!RFC7960] and [@!RFC8617] and Section 5.8, below, all discuss
> this topic and/or possible strategies for addressing it.
> 
> Because of these challenges, some domains, particularly those with open
> signup
> capabilities, may prefer to remain at a policy of p=none. This topic is
> discussed
> further in section 11.4 below.
> 
> 11.4 Open Signup Domains and DMARC Policies
> 
> 
> Certain domains with open signup capabilities, where anyone can register an
> 
> account and send mail, may not want to implement p=reject. An example of
> such
> 
> domains would be consumer mailbox providers that used to be known as
> "freemail
> 
> providers". Domains with no DMARC policy or a policy of p=none are
> vulnerable
> 
> to spoofing, but their users can send mail using these registered email
> addresses
> 
> from unrelated third party systems (such as "forward to a friend" services)
> or participate
> 
> in mailing lists without impediment. The security challenges that this
> presents to the
> 
> domain owner are left up to those systems that allow open registration of
> users.

I don't understand the connection between DMARC policies and open signup 
domains?  What makes them in any way special relative to DMARC?

Scott K