Re: [Add] data integrity and DNSSEC or DoH/DoT

Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Fri, 23 August 2019 04:39 UTC

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Fri, 23 Aug 2019 05:39:13 +0100
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To: Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com>
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Subject: Re: [Add] data integrity and DNSSEC or DoH/DoT
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On Thu, Aug 22, 2019 at 1:41 PM Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com> wrote:

>
>
> > On 22 Aug 2019, at 08:00, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
> >
> > Suppose that I receive a bogus response to my A record query, how am I
> to usefully distinguish "this is malware blocking" from "this resolver is
> malicious"?
>
> I'm surprised that distinction matters to you. I thought any form of DNS
> blocking or filtering was malicious from your PoV. :-)
>

Smiley or no, this really doesn't seem like it advances the conversation.




> To be slightly less glib, the dnsop WG has an I-D on extended error codes.
> [And FWIW lack of a discrete error code(s) for validation failure is one of
> the things I think DNSSEC got wrong.] draft-ietf-dnsop-extended-error
> already goes some way to answering your question:
>
> 4.16.  Extended DNS Error Code 15 - Blocked
>
>    The resolver attempted to perfom a DNS query but the domain is
>    blacklisted due to a security policy implemented on the server being
>    directly talked to.
>
> 4.17.  Extended DNS Error Code 16 - Censored
>
>    The resolver attempted to perfom a DNS query but the domain was
>    blacklisted by a security policy imposed upon the server being talked
>    to.  Note that how the imposed policy is applied is irrelevant (in-
>    band DNS somehow, court order, etc).
>
> 4.18.  Extended DNS Error Code 17 - Prohibited
>
>    An authoritative or recursive resolver that receives a query from an
>    "unauthorized" client can annotate its REFUSED message with this
>    code.  Examples of "unauthorized" clients are recursive queries from
>    IP addresses outside the network, blacklisted IP addresses, local
>    policy, etc.
>
> I suppose draft-ietf-dnsop-extended-error could add another error code for
> the specific case of a malicious resolver. Whatever that might mean. Though
> I doubt the operators of such servers will choose to set that evil bit on
> their responses.
>
> PS A potential problem with this I-D is these extended error codes won’t
> be signed. So they can be spoofed by bad actors.


Yes, and for this reason I don't see how this solves the problem. It's just
"resolver blocked it and claims reason X".

-Ekr