Re: [Add] What to do in this potential working group

Ted Hardie <ted.ietf@gmail.com> Wed, 21 August 2019 20:11 UTC

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From: Ted Hardie <ted.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 21 Aug 2019 13:10:32 -0700
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To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
Cc: Jari Arkko <jari.arkko@piuha.net>, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>, ADD Mailing list <add@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Add] What to do in this potential working group
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Hi Stephen,

Once small point:

On Wed, Aug 21, 2019 at 12:58 PM Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
wrote:

>
> > Your concern is that using DoH as a response to the first and second
> > attacks is increasing the risks related to the third.  Is that
> > approximately correct?
>
> Perhaps not so much "using DoH" as (over-)concentrating
> queries.
>

I think it is important for us in this group to focus on areas where there
is protocol work to be done or operational practice to change where it
relates to applications doing DNS.  If you wish to write a document on the
general topic of why over-concentrating queries to the common resolvers is
risky, then I am not sure this is the right group for it.  And I personally
think the risks are actually quite different for DNS over port 53 than for
DNS over DoH or DoT, as the primary risk of observation or active MITM
attacks looms much larger there (and is made much easier when there are
common destinations).

regards,

Ted Hardie
(as an individual contributor)