Re: [Add] What to do in this potential working group

[David Conrad <[e-mail]>]

Alec,

On Aug 21, 2019, at 11:06 AM, Alec Muffett <[e-mail]> wrote:
> On Wed, 21 Aug 2019, 18:59 David Conrad, <[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:
> The only way to truly ensure a trustworthy answer is to protect the actual answer. Which is what DNSSEC does.
> Fortunately we do not have to wait for DNSSEC in order to get answers from the people from whom we wish them supplied, privately and untampered-with, which is the whole point of DNS over HTTPS.

As mentioned, this is not the traditional answer for what is “trustworthy” when it comes to DNS data: instead of trusting the zone owner (more specifically, the holder to the zone signing key), you are trusting the resolver operator.

The data is ONLY private between the end user and the resolver operator.  It is NOT private to the resolver operator (something people have been repeatedly pointing out) nor is it private between the resolver operator and the authorities.

Further, you cannot ensure to the end user that the “trusted” resolver operator has not tampered with the data, be it due to court order, internal attack, software bugs, etc.

Again, DNS over HTTPS protects the data channel. It does NOT protect the data.

Regards,
-drc