Re: [Add] data integrity and DNSSEC or DoH/DoT
Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Tue, 03 September 2019 13:47 UTC
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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Tue, 03 Sep 2019 06:46:52 -0700
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To: Neil Cook <neil.cook@open-xchange.com>
Cc: Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com>, ADD Mailing list <add@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Add] data integrity and DNSSEC or DoH/DoT
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On Tue, Sep 3, 2019 at 6:15 AM Neil Cook <neil.cook@open-xchange.com> wrote: > > > On 23 Aug 2019, at 06:39, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote: > > > > On Thu, Aug 22, 2019 at 1:41 PM Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com> wrote: > >> >> >> > On 22 Aug 2019, at 08:00, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com <ekr@rtfm..com>> >> wrote: >> > >> > Suppose that I receive a bogus response to my A record query, how am I >> to usefully distinguish "this is malware blocking" from "this resolver is >> malicious”? >> > > ... > > To be slightly less glib, the dnsop WG has an I-D on extended error codes. >> [And FWIW lack of a discrete error code(s) for validation failure is one of >> the things I think DNSSEC got wrong.] draft-ietf-dnsop-extended-error >> already goes some way to answering your question: >> >> 4.16. Extended DNS Error Code 15 - Blocked >> >> The resolver attempted to perfom a DNS query but the domain is >> blacklisted due to a security policy implemented on the server being >> directly talked to. >> >> 4.17. Extended DNS Error Code 16 - Censored >> >> The resolver attempted to perfom a DNS query but the domain was >> blacklisted by a security policy imposed upon the server being talked >> to. Note that how the imposed policy is applied is irrelevant (in- >> band DNS somehow, court order, etc). >> >> 4.18. Extended DNS Error Code 17 - Prohibited >> >> An authoritative or recursive resolver that receives a query from an >> "unauthorized" client can annotate its REFUSED message with this >> code. Examples of "unauthorized" clients are recursive queries from >> IP addresses outside the network, blacklisted IP addresses, local >> policy, etc. >> >> I suppose draft-ietf-dnsop-extended-error could add another error code >> for the specific case of a malicious resolver. Whatever that might mean. >> Though I doubt the operators of such servers will choose to set that evil >> bit on their responses. >> >> PS A potential problem with this I-D is these extended error codes won’t >> be signed. So they can be spoofed by bad actors. > > > > I don’t see why malicious resolvers would tell clients they are returning > bogus results. > > Yes, and for this reason I don't see how this solves the problem. It's > just "resolver blocked it and claims reason X". > > > It’s not entirely useless. The problem it does solve is giving the user a > better experience when a site is blocked for resolvers that support this > extended Error Code. Currently for HTTPS the user will end up with a TLS > connection error of some kind (or a blank page in some browsers). If a > resolver returns a “blocked/censored/prohibited” response, then the browser > can tell the user that the web page was blocked with an informative > message. Assuming this becomes the default behaviour for non-malicious > resolvers then I think it will a good signal for distinguishing "this is > malware blocking" from "this resolver is malicious”. > I'm not following. Suppose that we add an error code that says "this site has malware". Now, I operate a resolver which is malicious in the sense that it wishes to block a certain form of content (say, access to the IETF) but don't want the people whose content I am blocking is being blocked for that reason. So, instead I return "this site has malware". My point here is that a code of this type only tells you what the resolver *asserts* the reason it blocked it is, it doesn't necessarily tell you what the actual reason that the content was blocked. -Ekr > > Neil Cook > neil.cook@open-xchange.com > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > Open-Xchange AG, Rollnerstr. 14, 90408 Nuremberg, District Court > Nuremberg HRB 24738 > Managing Board: Rafael Laguna de la Vera, Carsten Dirks, Michael > Knapstein, Stephan Martin > Chairman of the Board: Richard Seibt > > European Office: > Open-Xchange GmbH, Olper Huette 5f, D-57462 Olpe, Germany, District > Court Siegen, HRB 8718 > Managing Director: Frank Hoberg > > US Office: > Open-Xchange. Inc., 530 Lytton Avenue, Palo Alto, CA 94301, USA > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > >
- [Add] What to do in this potential working group Jari Arkko
- Re: [Add] What to do in this potential working gr… Eric Orth
- Re: [Add] What to do in this potential working gr… Jari Arkko
- Re: [Add] What to do in this potential working gr… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [Add] What to do in this potential working gr… Jim Reid
- Re: [Add] What to do in this potential working gr… Vittorio Bertola
- Re: [Add] What to do in this potential working gr… Jari Arkko
- Re: [Add] What to do in this potential working gr… Eric Vyncke (evyncke)
- Re: [Add] What to do in this potential working gr… Ted Lemon
- Re: [Add] What to do in this potential working gr… Jim Reid
- Re: [Add] What to do in this potential working gr… Ted Lemon
- Re: [Add] What to do in this potential working gr… Tommy Jensen
- Re: [Add] What to do in this potential working gr… Jari Arkko
- Re: [Add] What to do in this potential working gr… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [Add] What to do in this potential working gr… Ray Bellis
- Re: [Add] What to do in this potential working gr… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [Add] What to do in this potential working gr… Ray Bellis
- Re: [Add] What to do in this potential working gr… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [Add] What to do in this potential working gr… Ted Hardie
- Re: [Add] What to do in this potential working gr… David Conrad
- Re: [Add] What to do in this potential working gr… Alec Muffett
- Re: [Add] What to do in this potential working gr… Ted Hardie
- Re: [Add] What to do in this potential working gr… David Conrad
- Re: [Add] What to do in this potential working gr… Brian Dickson
- Re: [Add] What to do in this potential working gr… Brian Dickson
- Re: [Add] What to do in this potential working gr… Stephen Farrell
- Re: [Add] What to do in this potential working gr… Ted Hardie
- Re: [Add] What to do in this potential working gr… Alec Muffett
- Re: [Add] What to do in this potential working gr… Stephen Farrell
- Re: [Add] What to do in this potential working gr… David Conrad
- Re: [Add] What to do in this potential working gr… Rob Sayre
- Re: [Add] What to do in this potential working gr… Jari Arkko
- Re: [Add] What to do in this potential working gr… Stephen Farrell
- Re: [Add] What to do in this potential working gr… Alec Muffett
- Re: [Add] What to do in this potential working gr… Ted Hardie
- Re: [Add] What to do in this potential working gr… Adam Roach
- Re: [Add] What to do in this potential working gr… Ted Hardie
- Re: [Add] What to do in this potential working gr… David Conrad
- Re: [Add] What to do in this potential working gr… Rob Sayre
- Re: [Add] What to do in this potential working gr… Stephen Farrell
- Re: [Add] What to do in this potential working gr… Alec Muffett
- Re: [Add] What to do in this potential working gr… David Conrad
- [Add] data integrity and DNSSEC or DoH/DoT Jim Reid
- Re: [Add] What to do in this potential working gr… Rob Sayre
- Re: [Add] data integrity and DNSSEC or DoH/DoT Stephen Farrell
- Re: [Add] data integrity and DNSSEC or DoH/DoT David Conrad
- Re: [Add] data integrity and DNSSEC or DoH/DoT Rob Sayre
- Re: [Add] data integrity and DNSSEC or DoH/DoT Stephen Farrell
- Re: [Add] Unstated assumptions in What to do in t… John Levine
- Re: [Add] data integrity and DNSSEC or DoH/DoT Brian Dickson
- Re: [Add] What to do in this potential working gr… Patrik Fältström
- Re: [Add] What to do in this potential working gr… Patrik Fältström
- Re: [Add] What to do in this potential working gr… Rob Sayre
- Re: [Add] What to do in this potential working gr… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [Add] What to do in this potential working gr… Martin Thomson
- Re: [Add] data integrity and DNSSEC or DoH/DoT Eric Rescorla
- Re: [Add] What to do in this potential working gr… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [Add] What to do in this potential working gr… Jari Arkko
- Re: [Add] What to do in this potential working gr… Daniel Stenberg
- Re: [Add] What to do in this potential working gr… Jari Arkko
- Re: [Add] data integrity and DNSSEC or DoH/DoT Stephen Farrell
- Re: [Add] What to do in this potential working gr… Ray Bellis
- Re: [Add] What to do in this potential working gr… Martin J. Dürst
- Re: [Add] What to do in this potential working gr… Stephen Farrell
- Re: [Add] What to do in this potential working gr… Vittorio Bertola
- Re: [Add] What to do in this potential working gr… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [Add] What to do in this potential working gr… Ralf Weber
- Re: [Add] data integrity and DNSSEC or DoH/DoT Ralf Weber
- Re: [Add] data integrity and DNSSEC or DoH/DoT Willem Toorop
- Re: [Add] data integrity and DNSSEC or DoH/DoT Jim Reid
- Re: [Add] What to do in this potential working gr… Rubens Kuhl
- Re: [Add] data integrity and DNSSEC or DoH/DoT Paul Wouters
- Re: [Add] What to do in this potential working gr… Paul Wouters
- Re: [Add] data integrity and DNSSEC or DoH/DoT Livingood, Jason
- Re: [Add] What to do in this potential working gr… Livingood, Jason
- Re: [Add] What to do in this potential working gr… Livingood, Jason
- Re: [Add] What to do in this potential working gr… Livingood, Jason
- Re: [Add] What to do in this potential working gr… Adam Roach
- Re: [Add] What to do in this potential working gr… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [Add] data integrity and DNSSEC or DoH/DoT Eric Rescorla
- Re: [Add] data integrity and DNSSEC or DoH/DoT Rob Sayre
- Re: [Add] data integrity and DNSSEC or DoH/DoT Jim Reid
- Re: [Add] What to do in this potential working gr… Vittorio Bertola
- Re: [Add] data integrity and DNSSEC or DoH/DoT Eric Rescorla
- Re: [Add] data integrity and DNSSEC or DoH/DoT Brian Dickson
- Re: [Add] data integrity and DNSSEC or DoH/DoT Jim Reid
- Re: [Add] data integrity and DNSSEC or DoH/DoT Eric Rescorla
- Re: [Add] data integrity and DNSSEC or DoH/DoT Neil Cook
- Re: [Add] data integrity and DNSSEC or DoH/DoT Neil Cook
- Re: [Add] data integrity and DNSSEC or DoH/DoT Neil Cook
- Re: [Add] data integrity and DNSSEC or DoH/DoT Paul Wouters
- Re: [Add] data integrity and DNSSEC or DoH/DoT Christian Huitema
- Re: [Add] data integrity and DNSSEC or DoH/DoT Christian Huitema
- Re: [Add] data integrity and DNSSEC or DoH/DoT Brian Dickson
- Re: [Add] data integrity and DNSSEC or DoH/DoT Andrew Campling
- Re: [Add] data integrity and DNSSEC or DoH/DoT Vittorio Bertola
- Re: [Add] data integrity and DNSSEC or DoH/DoT Paul Wouters
- Re: [Add] data integrity and DNSSEC or DoH/DoT Vittorio Bertola
- Re: [Add] data integrity and DNSSEC or DoH/DoT Alec Muffett
- Re: [Add] data integrity and DNSSEC or DoH/DoT Alec Muffett