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Re: Montevideo statement

manning bill <bmanning@isi.edu> Tue, 08 October 2013 12:55 UTC

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Subject: Re: Montevideo statement
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From: manning bill <bmanning@isi.edu>
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Date: Tue, 08 Oct 2013 05:53:42 -0700
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To: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
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> 
> 
> I think the US executive branch would be better rid of the control before the vandals work out how to use it for mischief. But better would be to ensure that no such leverage exists. There is no reason for the apex of the DNS to be a single root, it could be signed by a quorum of signers (in addition to the key splitting which I am fully familiar with). And every government should be assigned a sovereign reserve of IPv6 addresses to prevent a scarcity being used as leverage. 
> 
> -- 
> Website: http://hallambaker.com/

	Quorum signing with split keys  was already built and tested in a root server operator testbed (the OTDR testbed) from 1998-2005.  It was considered more fragile than the current system.

/bill

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