Re: Extending a /64

Nick Hilliard <nick@foobar.org> Fri, 20 November 2020 16:26 UTC

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Subject: Re: Extending a /64
To: Mark Smith <markzzzsmith@gmail.com>
Cc: Tony Whyman <tony.whyman@mccallumwhyman.com>, 6man WG <ipv6@ietf.org>
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From: Nick Hilliard <nick@foobar.org>
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Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2020 16:26:37 +0000
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Mark Smith wrote on 20/11/2020 02:49:
> ULAs are specifically designed to allow interconnecting to other ULA 
> networks without resorting to renumbering or IPv6 NAT.

Mark,

yep, we know what ULAs are.  What makes them unsuitable is their 
specification as address ranges "with high probability of uniqueness".

Earlier in the thread you expressed concerns about risk management, 
including images of planes falling out of the sky and invocation of 
insurance risk and regulatory involvement.  If risk is a concern here, 
then addressing models with a "high probability of uniqueness" are not 
going to be viable, because this risk can be eliminated with a low 
outlay by using registered address space.

Can we now park this aspect of the discussion?

Nick