Re: [dmarc-ietf] Call for Adoption: DMARC Use of the RFC5322.Sender Header Field

Alessandro Vesely <vesely@tana.it> Sat, 15 August 2020 07:46 UTC

Return-Path: <vesely@tana.it>
X-Original-To: dmarc@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: dmarc@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1643B3A08B9 for <dmarc@ietfa.amsl.com>; Sat, 15 Aug 2020 00:46:56 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -3.047
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.047 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, NICE_REPLY_A=-0.949, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H3=0.001, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_WL=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1152-bit key) header.d=tana.it
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 2b5PeK4OkCop for <dmarc@ietfa.amsl.com>; Sat, 15 Aug 2020 00:46:54 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from wmail.tana.it (wmail.tana.it [62.94.243.226]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A58293A08B6 for <dmarc@ietf.org>; Sat, 15 Aug 2020 00:46:54 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=tana.it; s=delta; t=1597477611; bh=LKQtmlm9dLcAgS8qYZaNDtyEdxstYLOaGen4UrVvLD0=; l=2901; h=To:References:From:Date:In-Reply-To; b=BmyD/0xY6ZPdgZM5oKZq0kClNrs368bkqfEG5H1rRONUEeu/Kz+8iRblNPZqGzgiQ lxtoChNu8LwbMSgMDwWQLGU88y7xNRmrQVFj5cKWXUkHMxAXbRb995gpqhcHuUAFLK QJ18FSWuBXZDb4ivlCVfySU9bmhIXzI1xBrT7bZD77pmEvuxveBLkWlXqFh+k
Authentication-Results: tana.it; auth=pass (details omitted)
Received: from [192.168.1.102] ([5.170.69.62]) (AUTH: CRAM-MD5 uXDGrn@SYT0/k, TLS: TLS1.3, 128bits, ECDHE_RSA_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) by wmail.tana.it with ESMTPSA id 00000000005DC042.000000005F3792EA.00004950; Sat, 15 Aug 2020 09:46:50 +0200
To: dmarc@ietf.org, Dotzero <dotzero@gmail.com>, John Levine <johnl@taugh.com>
References: <CAJ4XoYcFbh8-nAxjxzzRgUahFfhcgcZQ2yMF2ewv_-DgUmhL=g@mail.gmail.com> <20200814164237.313071E971DB@ary.local> <CAJ4XoYeqj_5mpZu1PZP4rNfrWRyC5gC-2dfK7oX9xQHiR24QeA@mail.gmail.com>
From: Alessandro Vesely <vesely@tana.it>
Message-ID: <085c6a5f-5451-ae8c-4873-133673ba1754@tana.it>
Date: Sat, 15 Aug 2020 09:46:44 +0200
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/68.10.0
MIME-Version: 1.0
In-Reply-To: <CAJ4XoYeqj_5mpZu1PZP4rNfrWRyC5gC-2dfK7oX9xQHiR24QeA@mail.gmail.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"; format="flowed"
Content-Language: en-US
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/dmarc/rzzkrQA39WT4iYBOjFPrGzP7xTY>
Subject: Re: [dmarc-ietf] Call for Adoption: DMARC Use of the RFC5322.Sender Header Field
X-BeenThere: dmarc@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: "Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Compliance \(DMARC\)" <dmarc.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/dmarc>, <mailto:dmarc-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/dmarc/>
List-Post: <mailto:dmarc@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:dmarc-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dmarc>, <mailto:dmarc-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 15 Aug 2020 07:46:56 -0000

On 2020-08-14 7:04 p.m., Dotzero wrote:
> On Fri, Aug 14, 2020 at 12:42 PM John Levine <johnl@taugh.com> wrote:
>> In article <CAJ4XoYcFbh8-nAxjxzzRgUahFfhcgcZQ2yMF2ewv_-DgUmhLg@mail.gmail.com> you write:
>>> [...]
>>
>>> This is why I made the point above that lists should respect DMARC
>>> policy and not accept submissions from domains with DMARC p=reject
>>> policies.
>>
>> Lists have been around a lot longer than DMARC has.


That doesn't grant lists any extra right.  Others consider current 
global usage as a priority gauge.


>> Perhaps you meant to say that domains whose users participate in
>> mailing lists should not publish restrictive DMARC policies. If
>> they don't want their users to send mail to lists, they should
>> tell their users not to send mail to lists.

Should they file lawsuits against online infringers?


> I meant what I wrote. Domains who actively want their users to participate
> in mailing lists or even passively accept that their users participate in
> mailing lists shouldn't publish p=reject for the domain their users are
> sending from or should take steps to migrate the users to another
> domain/subdomain, etc.


Why people's mailboxes must be spoofable?

Syllogism goes like so:  Mailing list must not accept strict DMARC 
policies, humans may happen to use mailing lists, therefore email 
domains which hosts mailboxes used by humans must not publish strict 
DMARC policies.  Is that really what we seek?  I hope not.

This is not the mailcore WG where they have to bring to full standard 
a time-honored paper.  We're talking about a protocol that is gaining 
adoption slowly as it has some troubles.  It's going to be Proposed 
Standard anyway.  Fixes may go as far as introducing Sender:.  In such 
a scenario, why should we stick to the restricted p=none except 
transactional?


> Conversely, if a domain IS publishing p=reject then yes, they
> should be taking steps internally but I also believe others should
> consider that domain's published policy as intentional and act 
> accordingly. I've never heard of a DMARC policy getting published
> due to inaction. Someone with administrative rights actively
> published that policy.

Possibly, that policy was pushed for security reasons.  We may say 
they don't know what they're doing.  They may say the same of us.

If DMARC cannot secure people's mailboxes, perhaps we should invent a 
different protocol.  It may still be based on SPF and DKIM 
authentication.  And still be called DMARC, no?


>> There are lots of organizations that actively want their employees to
>> participate in the IETF, to the extent that they give them paid time
>> for IETF activities, yet publish p=reject policies to cripple that
>> participation. I wish they would make up their minds.
>>
> 
> Me too.


We could make up our minds as well...


Best
Ale
--