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Re: [dmarc-ietf] non-mailing list use case for differing header domains

Alessandro Vesely <vesely@tana.it> Thu, 06 August 2020 08:16 UTC

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From: Alessandro Vesely <vesely@tana.it>
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Date: Thu, 06 Aug 2020 10:16:07 +0200
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Subject: Re: [dmarc-ietf] non-mailing list use case for differing header domains
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On 2020-08-05 9:52 p.m., Dotzero wrote:
> Required authentication for .gov domains moved forward in fits and
> starts up to the point of the DHS mandate. DHS approached the use
> of DMARC and authentication as a blunt one size fits all
> instrument.

That makes sense!  If you look at email from a user POV, how can you
justify the fact that transactional mail is protected while ordinary
people's identities can be seized scot-free?

I think DHS interprets a general feeling.

> 
> The reality is that the devil is always in the details.


Right, and we're the fairy godmother who gotta work them out.  With
From: rewriting, Author: Sender:, To:, and DKIM transforms we're well
into it, aren't we?


Best
Ale
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