Re: ietf.org unaccessible for Tor users

[Michael StJohns <[e-mail]>]

On 3/16/2016 4:30 PM, Adam Roach wrote:
> On 3/16/16 15:23, Michael StJohns wrote:
>> On 3/16/2016 3:47 PM, Adam Roach wrote:
>>> As is the nature of a service used by people who need to stay 
>>> anonymous for their own safety,
>>
>> There's the set of TOR users, and there's the subset of TOR users 
>> that need to have the property of "anonymity for safety", and then 
>> there's the set of people who need/want access to the IETF.
>>
>> Could you provide an educated guess on the size of the intersection 
>> of those last two sets?   1?  10s? 100s? 1000s? More?   I'm trying to 
>> understand the amount of hyperbole being slung about.
>
> I'm just going to put back the second half of the sentence that you 
> cut off in your quote above: "you're not going to find a lot in the 
> way of data or anecdote here."

Fair enough - so you're asking me to take it on faith that there is a 
real problem and that it effects sufficient numbers of folks that the 
IETF should spend *its* money and effort to fix?    Which fix might in 
itself cause other problems affecting all the rest of us.

Let me ask it another way - what is the minimum number of  people that 
this affects before you think the IETF should spend its resources?  100? 
10? 1?   (Note - I'm asking for the case where the cost to provide the 
accommodation is non-trivial).


>
>> Finally, are there any other methods besides Tor you can think of 
>> that would give "anonymity for safety" while still providing access 
>> to the IETF data? (Hint: asking a friend to photocopy paper or send 
>> you a usb stick.... or...)
>
> I propose you limit yourself to those methods of participation for a 
> suitably long time period -- say, a year or so -- and then report back 
> with your experiences of whether you think it posed an unreasonable 
> barrier.

I propose that at least one person with fear for their life if their 
anonymity is compromised who needs continuous access to the IETF for 
that same 1 year actually explain the problem in a non-anecdotal way.   
I'm still trying to wrap my head around an "I must not be caught" 
protocol designer.

Mike

>
> /a