IETF Logo Mail Archive

Re: [dmarc-ietf] Ticket #55 - Clarify legal and privacy implications of failure reports

Dave Crocker <dhc@dcrocker.net> Sat, 02 January 2021 22:06 UTC

Return-Path: <dhc@dcrocker.net>
X-Original-To: dmarc@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: dmarc@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 93CA93A0E82 for <dmarc@ietfa.amsl.com>; Sat, 2 Jan 2021 14:06:20 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.101
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.101 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, NICE_REPLY_A=-0.001, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H2=-0.001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=dcrocker.net
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id dcWyJnriwXqv for <dmarc@ietfa.amsl.com>; Sat, 2 Jan 2021 14:06:19 -0800 (PST)
Received: from bumble.maple.relay.mailchannels.net (bumble.maple.relay.mailchannels.net [23.83.214.25]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id AE5B63A0E81 for <dmarc@ietf.org>; Sat, 2 Jan 2021 14:06:18 -0800 (PST)
X-Sender-Id: hostingeremail|x-authsender|dhc@dcrocker.net
Received: from relay.mailchannels.net (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by relay.mailchannels.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7DBC636091C for <dmarc@ietf.org>; Sat, 2 Jan 2021 22:06:17 +0000 (UTC)
Received: from nl-srv-smtpout2.hostinger.io (100-96-9-178.trex.outbound.svc.cluster.local [100.96.9.178]) (Authenticated sender: hostingeremail) by relay.mailchannels.net (Postfix) with ESMTPA id 674AB360213 for <dmarc@ietf.org>; Sat, 2 Jan 2021 22:06:16 +0000 (UTC)
X-Sender-Id: hostingeremail|x-authsender|dhc@dcrocker.net
Received: from nl-srv-smtpout2.hostinger.io ([UNAVAILABLE]. [145.14.159.14]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384) by 0.0.0.0:2500 (trex/5.18.11); Sat, 02 Jan 2021 22:06:17 +0000
X-MC-Relay: Neutral
X-MailChannels-SenderId: hostingeremail|x-authsender|dhc@dcrocker.net
X-MailChannels-Auth-Id: hostingeremail
X-Battle-Minister: 2a4312c25cbe1f86_1609625177038_1397405837
X-MC-Loop-Signature: 1609625177038:3842476714
X-MC-Ingress-Time: 1609625177038
Received: from [192.168.0.109] (c-24-130-62-181.hsd1.ca.comcast.net [24.130.62.181]) (Authenticated sender: dhc@dcrocker.net) by nl-srv-smtpout2.hostinger.io (smtp.hostinger.com) with ESMTPSA id 7DD3D333EFAF for <dmarc@ietf.org>; Sat, 2 Jan 2021 22:06:14 +0000 (UTC)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=simple/simple; d=dcrocker.net; s=hostingermail-a; t=1609625174; bh=Bzup/uBV/IPSGiwPs5y8tzilAa6A0xqjuAwz1ngu1+o=; h=Reply-To:Subject:To:References:From:Date:In-Reply-To; b=AjhS+XKGjnn0piD9gsJq07pkSYrcLRb5H9aScqZxnkEcMT4tJEkUXElZuqswtSYdI O86WTmQg9Qsq19DFVszJ9KTs4xe7vreBLCLTJ2galkUyQ3dVHxkSaoo3CzfILnrxiG XcubbaJMjvacz3dITYehTAIXD7H4MHpVCoER21LojESfbKh6Hu63ZIeU5IJH7PDziq ZPM2oaHoakbH3AL6VDZAq08gf9QkPxxqKduXUDnyhIjym9WL5jVTHb613rOycMSvvb u3uqwZv+AiwIstJKUhWxkhGnTl53MsLTTIf524KVx3P6Pm+j1BMeiKervLw2QYaiJ3 hNdw4PuFxrM7w==
Reply-To: dcrocker@bbiw.net
To: dmarc@ietf.org
References: <20201231160030.20AFB3EE7AD7@ary.qy> <4bd444a4-0c34-467a-cfcb-a8f7c14b723d@tana.it> <b030d1f-44d4-4330-eb17-c930eb968be2@taugh.com> <3999b617-b0e7-7341-93df-4a2ccea134e4@tana.it> <64cb14ed-322b-eecb-bed2-13349e19b833@taugh.com> <f0fa378a-f963-c96b-f9a1-a1bea16910fd@mtcc.com>
From: Dave Crocker <dhc@dcrocker.net>
Organization: Brandenburg InternetWorking
Message-ID: <9c126f51-39da-b581-5a97-420e781f97d8@dcrocker.net>
Date: Sat, 02 Jan 2021 14:06:12 -0800
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:78.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/78.6.0
MIME-Version: 1.0
In-Reply-To: <f0fa378a-f963-c96b-f9a1-a1bea16910fd@mtcc.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"; format="flowed"
Content-Language: en-US
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/dmarc/lcMPvXde6aZsqgBI4oSOK9xoe1c>
Subject: Re: [dmarc-ietf] Ticket #55 - Clarify legal and privacy implications of failure reports
X-BeenThere: dmarc@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: "Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Compliance \(DMARC\)" <dmarc.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/dmarc>, <mailto:dmarc-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/dmarc/>
List-Post: <mailto:dmarc@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:dmarc-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dmarc>, <mailto:dmarc-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 02 Jan 2021 22:06:21 -0000

> The entire problem with catering to the long tail is that it is holding 
> hostage better email security. We should stop doing that.


The entire problem with statements like these is that they provide a 
cavalier dismissal of established practice, while lacking thoughtful 
cost/benefit detail, as well as failing to consider more general 
application of the 'logic'.

Email (and most other online) security has a sufficiently poor record so 
that claims about what is essential to do -- absent compellingly 
validated, reliable, and precise data -- has nothing at all with what is 
essential to do and everything to do with avoiding serious discussion.


d/
-- 
Dave Crocker
Brandenburg InternetWorking
bbiw.net

v2.45.0 | Report a Bug | By Email | System Status