Re: [hrpc] Censorship

Eliot Lear <lear@lear.ch> Fri, 11 March 2022 12:00 UTC

Return-Path: <lear@lear.ch>
X-Original-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0345E3A12B7 for <hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com>; Fri, 11 Mar 2022 04:00:16 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -0.9
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.9 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_ADSP_ALL=0.8, DKIM_INVALID=0.1, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, NICE_REPLY_A=-0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_BLOCKED=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, T_SCC_BODY_TEXT_LINE=-0.01, T_SPF_HELO_PERMERROR=0.01] autolearn=no autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=fail (1024-bit key) reason="fail (message has been altered)" header.d=lear.ch
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 4F8xfffYMUe5 for <hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com>; Fri, 11 Mar 2022 04:00:10 -0800 (PST)
Received: from upstairs.ofcourseimright.com (upstairs.ofcourseimright.com [185.32.222.29]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 888A03A12D6 for <hrpc@irtf.org>; Fri, 11 Mar 2022 04:00:09 -0800 (PST)
Received: from [10.61.144.242] ([173.38.220.47]) (authenticated bits=0) by upstairs.ofcourseimright.com (8.15.2/8.15.2/Debian-18) with ESMTPSA id 22BC04pc766356 (version=TLSv1.3 cipher=TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 bits=128 verify=NO); Fri, 11 Mar 2022 13:00:05 +0100
Authentication-Results: upstairs.ofcourseimright.com; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=lear.ch
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=simple/simple; d=lear.ch; s=upstairs; t=1647000006; bh=568oGpaTvDCt3spnVsO/3XrRzhVP2gFpZj7dZYBzMWU=; h=Date:To:Cc:References:From:Subject:In-Reply-To:From; b=pcI+6FSAso0EPocTy3VRO6ze9c8VdcGmof9fPtee9NKPq8OdLtUZdfsBj5vCe/eNz 2UZW0+p/RykKnanXxdauVAlbqHICKnaP4QMMbIvUkjXTCq0p1b3k6Neh55trhayrn3 pVluH21rqf/dQNXXCv05MIu0hg8ujC+QOWJ5Le/s=
Message-ID: <d85efa68-9ec3-be29-b70d-7efcf6278f91@lear.ch>
Date: Fri, 11 Mar 2022 13:00:00 +0100
MIME-Version: 1.0
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15; rv:91.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/91.6.2
Content-Language: en-US
To: Bill Woodcock <woody@pch.net>, Vittorio Bertola <vittorio.bertola@open-xchange.com>
Cc: "hrpc@irtf.org" <hrpc@irtf.org>
References: <669686052.184329.1646989079672@appsuite-gw2.open-xchange.com> <AFDE14D7-A5A1-4009-9E8D-C77D4984EDDA@pch.net> <254407218.184957.1646992776229@appsuite-gw2.open-xchange.com> <EA324F84-FAE9-4F76-A25A-0044BD5BE34C@pch.net>
From: Eliot Lear <lear@lear.ch>
In-Reply-To: <EA324F84-FAE9-4F76-A25A-0044BD5BE34C@pch.net>
Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg="pgp-sha256"; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; boundary="------------YuyFhlh03oqnnGLN6skD9C5A"
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/hrpc/bh7vrgF6FK4LtpEOLHxdWTVgw1E>
Subject: Re: [hrpc] Censorship
X-BeenThere: hrpc@irtf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: hrpc discussion list <hrpc.irtf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.irtf.org/mailman/options/hrpc>, <mailto:hrpc-request@irtf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/hrpc/>
List-Post: <mailto:hrpc@irtf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:hrpc-request@irtf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc>, <mailto:hrpc-request@irtf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 11 Mar 2022 12:00:22 -0000

Bill,

The reason I believe that this RG is an appropriate venue to discuss 
your communique is that each of the assertions you and others make seem 
to me closer to research questions.  Full disclosure: my own view is 
that *if* the Internet community could effectively contribute to forcing 
Russia out of Ukraine, we have a moral obligation to do so.  However, I 
don't believe we can effectively contribute to that goal at the 
governance level, and maybe not at any other level.

Your assertions are:

>  *
>
>     ● Disconnecting the population of a country from the Internet is a
>     disproportionate and inappropriate sanction, since it hampers
>     their access to the very information that might lead them to
>     withdraw support for acts of war and leaves them with access to
>     only the information their own government chooses to furnish.
>
This is indeed the theory.  Nothing like a live experiment to test it.  
Anyone collecting data?


>  *
>
>     ● The effectiveness of sanctions should be evaluated relative to
>     predefined goals. Ineffective sanctions waste effort and willpower
>     and convey neither unity nor conviction.
>
There's a lot of devil hidden in the detail of "predefined goals", and 
there is a body of research around this.  Also, it doesn't follow that 
ineffective sanctions fail to convey unity or conviction.  If the goal 
is to get Russia out of Ukraine and they don't leave, does that mean 
that the west has failed to convey conviction?


>  *
>
>     ● Sanctions should be focused and precise. They should minimize
>     the chance of unintended consequences or collateral damage.
>     Disproportionate or over-broad sanctions risk fundamentally
>     alienating populations.
>
Again, there is a body of research around this.


>  *
>
>     ● Military and propaganda agencies and their information
>     infrastructure are potential targets of sanctions.
>
Is this meant to be an exclusive list?


>  *
>
>     ● The Internet, due to its transnational nature and
>     consensus-driven multistakeholder system of governance, currently
>     does not easily lend itself to the imposition of sanctions in
>     national conflicts.
>
I have my own view as to why this is true.  But it may be worth 
elaborating in detail.


>  *
>
>     ● It is inappropriate and counterproductive for governments to
>     attempt to compel Internet governance mechanisms to impose
>     sanctions outside of the community’s multistakeholder
>     decision-making process.
>
Yeah, this requires a discussion of supremecy and subservience. Who is 
supreme and why and where are the guns to back that up?


>  *
>
>     ● There are nonetheless appropriate, effective, and specific
>     sanctions the Internet governance community may wish to consider
>     in its deliberative processes.
>
Elaborate.