Re: [hrpc] ***SPAM**** Re: Censorship

[Niels ten Oever <[e-mail]>]

On 15-03-2022 15:50, Mallory Knodel wrote:
> Hi,
> 
> On 3/14/22 7:43 PM, Stephen Farrell wrote:
>> On 14/03/2022 20:17, Jens Finkhaeuser wrote:
>>> Bill's last reply and my reading of the paper suggests that the main
>>> point here is to create a defensible position for network operators
>>> against too much filtering: they can hardly be accused of doing
>>> nothing if they filter something. And if the filters are created
>>> carefully by a multi-stakeholder organization in full consideration
>>> of their impact on human rights, calls for stricter measures
>>> automatically cast a bad light on the party doing the calling - and
>>> network operators may use that in the Internet's favour.
>> But aside from considering efficacy, do we have any examples
>> of blocklists for which the evidence justifying a block, and
>> all the process steps leading to a decision to add an entry,
>> are public?
> 
> I have seen leaked lists but none are public. Some stretching into the tens of thousands. Some mandatory, some as guidance.
> 
> This speaks to yet another paradox of this exercise. If you publish the blocklist and make recommendations on how to do it technically then you are facilitating circumvention. As Andrew said before, you can be proportionate (and accountable) but then you are ineffective.

I am not convinced this is necessarily the case. It would indeed be a cat and mouse game, but it would definitely have consequences. It would both send a message (what some have been calling 'feel good', but which I think is more than that) and cause labor for an institution that is currently using all of its capacity for violence against another population and censorship against its own.

> 
> This itself is a proportionality test. And I don't believe the authors have presented a tradeoff that is proportionate given the political risks. 

No, the authors of the statement have only proposed principles and a

I'll answer Bill's previous question to me about political risks. In the case of censoring, or boycotting through internet cutoff, the Russian military, you are:
> 
>   * Provoking Russia on national security and it will have ramifications at the UN on the cybercrime treaty and any future hope of a cybersecurity treaty,

How would that be different from the current positioning of Russia?
> 
>   * Giving Russia an excuse to continue building its own internet, splintering further away,

Again, seeing the position of Russia during WTSA and the passing of its recent regulations, how would this be different? Now that it still is connected, this connection could be leveraged.
> 
>   * Undermining civil society's prior positioning firmly against all internet censorship even to advocate for carve outs in sanctions,

I don't think civil society has positioned itself again all filtering.

> 
>   * Normalising blocking by intermediaries that haven't the in-house capacity to take a political position, when instead we should be helping build their capacity to resist unjust blocking,

I don't see why these can't happen at the same time. By developing capacity in a multistakeholder body brings the discussion in the open and brings together more capacity, perspective, and experience.
> 
>   * Moving out of alignment what is best for the internet and what is best for people,
> 

Not sure what is meant with this.

>   * Making more incoherent messaging and guidance about is "right" to do, not less.
> 

Not sure what is meant with this.

>   * Abstracting the nascent capacity to govern the internet with political considerations away from where those decisions should instead be made.
> 

If we come to the conclusion that internet governance should explicitly not do this but leave this to states, this I think should be reflected in statements such as that of RIPE, and not say: we will do everything lawfully possible fight this.

>> It might be that if the proponents here fleshed out the idea
>> another level deeper, then it'd be easier to understand just
>> what's envisaged. Personally, I can't really see how to setup
>> anything resembling what's envisaged, but I may be missing
>> something.
> 
> This is what I have said, though not to the list: Follow through with the blocklist as proposed. Who are you waiting for to start this work?

Work is being done, but I think it is also important to bring people along.

> 
> As Bill said, no one has to ask permission to do things like this on the internet. So do the thing. Form your group and give the world a blocklist. Of course you'll never get the civil society sector to come to consensus about it, so you can't call it that (as you do in your letter). 

In my experience, there is never civil society consensus on anything, but that does not mean we should exhaustively try.

> The list will represent the views of the people who are in the group.

As it is with any multistakeholder decision making process, for better or for worse.

Best,

Niels

> If your advice has managed to persuade everyone, is valuable, is actionable and makes a difference, then your idea will succeed.
> 
> Gentle reminder to everyone in the discussion that we are meant here to identify research topics related to human rights and internet protocols.
> 
> My view on that is that I do see potential here, but it is as I have said already: what's important is for each existing internet governance body to identify objectionable behaviour within its mandate and to document how objectionable behaviour is actioned. HRPC could could survey the existing space for best practice and how that has already been done. Then outline how existing guidance might play out in various scenarios like war, what we think might be missing, and make recommendations for how to do fill those gaps.
> 
> -Mallory
> 

-- 
Niels ten Oever, PhD
Postdoctoral Researcher - Media Studies Department - University of Amsterdam
Affiliated Faculty - Digital Democracy Institute - Simon Fraser University
Non-Resident Fellow 2022-2023 - Center for Democracy & Technology
Associated Scholar - Centro de Tecnologia e Sociedade - Fundação Getúlio Vargas
Research Fellow - Centre for Internet and Human Rights - European University Viadrina

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Read my latest article on Internet infrastructure governance in Globalizations here: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14747731.2021.1953221