Re: Quic: the elephant in the room

Michael Thomas <mike@mtcc.com> Mon, 12 April 2021 16:19 UTC

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Subject: Re: Quic: the elephant in the room
To: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
Cc: Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com>, IETF Discussion Mailing List <ietf@ietf.org>
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From: Michael Thomas <mike@mtcc.com>
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Date: Mon, 12 Apr 2021 09:17:55 -0700
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On 4/12/21 9:14 AM, Nico Williams wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 12, 2021 at 09:02:57AM -0700, Michael Thomas wrote:
>> On 4/12/21 8:51 AM, Nico Williams wrote:
>>> You get better security properties (w.r.t. possible compromised root or
>>> ccTLD/TLD keys) if the resolver finds the DNSSEC chain on its own using
>>> qname minimization than you get with stapling, but I agree that stapling
>>> is a performance win.  We'll really want transparency for DNSSEC if we
>>> do any kind of full chain stapling.
>> Can somebody explain what "stapling" is?
> In general "stapling" means sending all the ancilliary things that the
> peer would otherwise have to lookup on its own to save it the bother.
> So:
>
>   - "OCSP" == RP sends request to OCSP Responder
>
>   - "stapled OCSP" == supplicant sends its EE cert and chain and cached
>     OCSPResponse to the RP so the RP need not go talk to an OCSP
>     Responder
>
>   - "DANE" == RP looks up all the relevant RRs needed to validate
>     supplican't certificate
>
>   - "stapled DANE" == supplicant sends TLSA RRs and DNSSEC chain along
>     with its certificate so that the RP need not perform those lookups
>     separately
>
> (RP == relying party)
> (supplicant == the entity authenticated by the end-endity certificate it
>   presents to the RP)
>
Ah, thanks. I was guessing it might be that. I assume it goes into the 
Additional RR's like SoA records. Are there rules on what a can be 
supplied as additional RR's? Is the client allowed to supply hints or 
does the DNS server have to just guess?

Mike