Re: Quic: the elephant in the room
Andrew McConachie <andrew@depht.com> Mon, 12 April 2021 10:36 UTC
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From: Andrew McConachie <andrew@depht.com>
To: Michael Thomas <mike@mtcc.com>
Cc: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>, Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com>, IETF Discussion Mailing List <ietf@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: Quic: the elephant in the room
Date: Mon, 12 Apr 2021 12:36:43 +0200
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On 11 Apr 2021, at 20:13, Michael Thomas wrote: > On 4/11/21 10:23 AM, Salz, Rich wrote: >> >> * I don't see why [DNS timeouts] it can't be long lived, but even >> normal TTL's would get amortized over a lot of connections. Right >> now with certs it is a 5 message affair which cannot get better. >> But that is why one of $BROWSERVENDORS doing an experiment would >> be helpful. >> >> There are use-cases where a five-second DNS TTL is important. And >> they’re not amortized over multiple connections from **one** user, >> but rather affect **many** users. Imagine an e-commerce site >> connected to two CDN’s who needs to switch. >> > The worst case is that it devolves into what we already have: 5 > messages assuming NS records are cached normally. > > Another approach using current infrastructure would be for the client > to cache the certs and hand the server cert the fingerprint(s) in the > ClientHello and the server sends down the chosen cert's fingerprint > instead of the cert which could get it back to 3 messages too. That > would require hacking on TLS though (assuming that somebody hasn't > already thought of this). That has the upside is that it's the server > chooses whether it wants to use the cached version or not too. For the past 2 years or so I’ve been performing HTTPS DANE validation on all TLS 1.1 and 1.2 connections egressing my house. I use custom code written for OpenWRT that installs ACLs to block TLS connections that fail DANE validation. More info here. <https://www.middlebox-dane.org/> The short story is that it works pretty well. I usually forget I have it running, and on the off chance I hit a website with invalid TLSA RRs that gets blocked it usually takes me a few minutes to try and figure out why the website isn’t loading. One thing I’ve learned from this experiment is that, atleast in my situation, DNS is always faster than any TLS setup time that matters. The web is horrendously slow, so even if TLS setup completes my OpenWRT box will kill the TLS connection long before any real data gets transferred. These things happen asynchronously, and I have Unbound running directly on the OpenWRT box, so DNS always wins. But even if the TLS handshake were to complete fully and only then get killed by OpenWRT it would be the same outcome. When looking at how one might implement DANE for HTTPS/TLS I don’t see any reason to handle these things sequentially. You don’t have to change TLS you just have to do things asynchronously. Query for TLSA RRs at the same time as sending the TLS ClientHello, and kill the connection setup when/if DANE validation fails. On the off chance that the DNS actually takes longer than TLS, maybe delay sending data via TLS until DNS responds. But I bet this almost never happens. If you really don’t want any slow down from DANE just setup TLS normally and only kill it once DANE validation fails. The web is so slow that the chances something significant will happen prior to the client fetching the TLSA RR and performing DANE validation are practically nil. Thanks, Andrew
- Quic: the elephant in the room Michael Thomas
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Michael Thomas
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Ben Laurie
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Stephane Bortzmeyer
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Ben Laurie
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Michael Thomas
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Nico Williams
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Michael Thomas
- Re: DNS vs PKI, was Quic: the elephant in the room John Levine
- Re: DNS vs PKI, was Quic: the elephant in the room Michael Thomas
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Nico Williams
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Michael Thomas
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Nico Williams
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Michael Thomas
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Michael Thomas
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Ben Laurie
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Ben Laurie
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Ben Laurie
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Michael Thomas
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Michael Thomas
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Michael Thomas
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Nico Williams
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Nico Williams
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Salz, Rich
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Michael Thomas
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Michael Thomas
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Nico Williams
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Michael Thomas
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Salz, Rich
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Ben Laurie
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Ben Laurie
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Michael Thomas
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Ben Laurie
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room David Conrad
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room David Conrad
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Viktor Dukhovni
- DNSSEC architecture vs reality (was: Re: Quic: th… Keith Moore
- Re: DNSSEC architecture vs reality (was: Re: Quic… Michael Thomas
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Nico Williams
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Salz, Rich
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Nico Williams
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: DNSSEC architecture vs reality (was: Re: Quic… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Andrew McConachie
- Re: DNSSEC architecture vs reality Keith Moore
- Re: DNSSEC architecture vs reality Petite Abeille
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Salz, Rich
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Salz, Rich
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: DNSSEC architecture vs reality Marco Davids
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Michael Thomas
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Michael Thomas
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Michael Thomas
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Michael Thomas
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Salz, Rich
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Michael Thomas
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Michael Thomas
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Nico Williams
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Nico Williams
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Michael Thomas
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Nico Williams
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Nico Williams
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Michael Thomas
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Salz, Rich
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Nico Williams
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Salz, Rich
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Salz, Rich
- Re: DNSSEC architecture vs reality Michael Thomas
- Re: DNSSEC architecture vs reality Nico Williams
- Re: DNSSEC architecture vs reality Michael Thomas
- Re: DNSSEC architecture vs reality Nico Williams
- Re: DNSSEC architecture vs reality Michael Thomas
- Re: DNSSEC architecture vs reality Nico Williams
- Re: DNSSEC architecture vs reality Michael Thomas
- Re: DNSSEC architecture vs reality John C Klensin
- Re: DNSSEC architecture vs reality Keith Moore
- Re: DNSSEC architecture vs reality Michael Thomas
- Re: DNSSEC architecture vs reality Michael Thomas
- Re: DNSSEC architecture vs reality Keith Moore
- Re: DNSSEC architecture vs reality Nico Williams
- Re: DNSSEC architecture vs reality Michael Thomas
- Re: DNSSEC architecture vs reality John C Klensin
- Re: DNSSEC architecture vs reality Keith Moore
- Re: DNSSEC architecture vs reality Michael Thomas
- Re: DNSSEC architecture vs reality Nico Williams
- Re: new RRTYPEs, was DNSSEC architecture vs reali… John Levine
- Re: new RRTYPEs, was DNSSEC architecture vs reali… Mark Andrews
- Re: DNSSEC architecture vs reality Petite Abeille
- Re: DNSSEC architecture vs reality Petite Abeille
- Re: DNSSEC architecture vs reality Andrew McConachie
- Re: DNSSEC architecture vs reality Patrik Fältström
- Re: DNSSEC architecture vs reality Eliot Lear
- Re: DNSSEC architecture vs reality Patrik Fältström
- Re: DNSSEC architecture vs reality Patrik Fältström
- Re: new RRTYPEs, was DNSSEC architecture vs reali… John R Levine
- Re: DNSSEC architecture vs reality Nico Williams
- Re: DNSSEC architecture vs reality Nico Williams
- Re: DNSSEC architecture vs reality Jim Fenton
- Re: DNSSEC architecture vs reality Masataka Ohta
- Re: DNSSEC architecture vs reality Petite Abeille
- Re: new RRTYPEs, was DNSSEC architecture vs reali… Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: new RRTYPEs, was DNSSEC architecture vs reali… Nico Williams
- Re: new RRTYPEs, was DNSSEC architecture vs reali… Donald Eastlake
- Re: new RRTYPEs, was DNSSEC architecture vs reali… Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: new RRTYPEs, was DNSSEC architecture vs reali… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: new RRTYPEs, was DNSSEC architecture vs reali… Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: new RRTYPEs, was DNSSEC architecture vs reali… Vittorio Bertola
- Re: new RRTYPEs, was DNSSEC architecture vs reali… Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: Fwd: Quic: the Elephant in the Room Michael Thomas
- Fwd: Quic: the Elephant in the Room Lars Eggert
- RE: Fwd: Quic: the Elephant in the Room Vasilenko Eduard
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Ben Laurie
- Re: Quic: the elephant in the room Phillip Hallam-Baker