Re: Quic: the elephant in the room

Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com> Mon, 12 April 2021 15:51 UTC

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Date: Mon, 12 Apr 2021 10:51:22 -0500
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From: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
To: Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com>
Cc: Michael Thomas <mike@mtcc.com>, IETF Discussion Mailing List <ietf@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: Quic: the elephant in the room
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References: <3b25c77d-e721-e86d-6c34-a90039aab0e2@mtcc.com> <CAMm+Lwhi8xwFgZJL7jod2g4urZt_f+dm0tNi+3y1osqOfch2mQ@mail.gmail.com> <3593a01f-73f4-7d03-a85b-dff64a8b070e@mtcc.com> <506A780B-9C0D-4F4A-B045-098F6152F4DB@akamai.com> <14cd802e-2a1b-97d4-c80d-b57f93e8cc21@mtcc.com> <E4374100-265E-4426-9F9A-AC437DA31D2B@depht.com> <15059e21-b7c2-4211-869e-df3ffdf7c34a@mtcc.com> <CAMm+LwgnoqXKNSKxt0-rDa8ze6J9LsZz0jVeogBXAWNDveC_ZQ@mail.gmail.com>
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On Mon, Apr 12, 2021 at 11:33:29AM -0400, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 12, 2021 at 11:22 AM Michael Thomas <mike@mtcc.com> wrote:
> > Correct. Better: you can do the TLSA request at the same time as the
> > A/AAAA request speculatively. Plus if you've ever had a TLSA record for
> > that domain, you know it's pretty likely you'll get a fresh one even if
> > the last one is expired, so the speculation is minimal.
> 
> Or replace the DNS resolver protocol with a privacy protected one in which
> a single request packet can be answered by multiple response packets. This
> maintains the 'stateless' nature of DNS queries but allows responses of
> 1-32 packets.

As long as it's not over UDP, or otherwise first has a return
routability check.

> Then a query to the responder can return the A record, the AAAA record, the
> SRV record, any relevant TXT and TLSA records [...]

Kinda like "any" queries.

>                                         [...] and the entire cert chain for
> one particular host chosen by the responder.

You get better security properties (w.r.t. possible compromised root or
ccTLD/TLD keys) if the resolver finds the DNSSEC chain on its own using
qname minimization than you get with stapling, but I agree that stapling
is a performance win.  We'll really want transparency for DNSSEC if we
do any kind of full chain stapling.

Nico
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