Re: [perpass] perens-perpass-appropriate-response-01

[Jacob Appelbaum <[e-mail]>]

Andreas Kuckartz:
> SM:
>> > I read
>> > http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/indias-big-brother-the-central-monitoring-system
>> > There are likely similar cases in other countries.
>> > 
>> > What could be the effect if (widely deployed) IETF protocols prevented
>> > such systems from working?  It is possible to design a protocol which
>> > does not allow "in the clear" traffic [1].  It is not clear whether such
>> > a protocol would be widely deployed.
> Jörg Ziercke, the president of the German Federal Criminal Office (BKA)
> three weeks ago suggested to restrict the right to use Tor by requiring
> the registration of users.
> 

Herr Ziercke clearly does not understand how Tor or even how IP networks
actually function.

> Standards can not solve such political and legal attempts to attack the
> privacy and security of users.
> 

I agree that standards will not solve political problems in the
political sphere. Standards will however limit the political and legal
options - as an example - forward secrecy with DHE makes forced key
disclosure irrelevant for retroactive decryption - the past traffic
cannot be decrypted as the session key is not derived from the identity
key.

> But that should not prevent the development of standards which disable
> mass surveillance when those standards are deployed.

I agree.

All the best,
Jacob