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Re: [Add] fixing coffee shop brokenness with DoH

Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Wed, 24 July 2019 17:15 UTC

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Wed, 24 Jul 2019 10:14:27 -0700
Message-ID: <CABcZeBOZiu_=VfWJDY_9V86TiGpsuZRKMCiersopxD+kTBBUtA@mail.gmail.com>
To: Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com>
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Subject: Re: [Add] fixing coffee shop brokenness with DoH
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On Wed, Jul 24, 2019 at 9:00 AM Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com> wrote:

>
>
> > On 24 Jul 2019, at 16:11, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
> >
> > See my response to Ted. From the perspective of the client, acting
> accordingly looks basically identical to how you behave with a valid
> NXDOMAIN, and so DNSSEC doesn't change the situation very much.
>
> Not really. A validation failure is a fairly strong indication that the
> resolver is lying to you.


Not really, no. Our current belief is that there is going to be quite a
high rate of non-malicious validation failures.


Or should be. So a security-aware application would know the current
> resolver can't be trusted (or is at the very least suspcious) and take
> suitable countermeasures. That's what I meant by "act accordingly".
>

What do you believe those countermeasures are?

-Ekr

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