IETF Logo Mail Archive

Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom

Mark Delany <MarkD+dkim@yahoo-inc.com> Fri, 04 August 2006 23:19 UTC

Received: from [10.91.34.44] (helo=ietf-mx.ietf.org) by megatron.ietf.org with esmtp (Exim 4.43) id 1G98xA-0007YV-6O for ietf-dkim-archive@lists.ietf.org; Fri, 04 Aug 2006 19:19:40 -0400
Received: from sb7.songbird.com ([208.184.79.137]) by ietf-mx.ietf.org with esmtp (Exim 4.43) id 1G98x8-0005XY-Qj for ietf-dkim-archive@lists.ietf.org; Fri, 04 Aug 2006 19:19:40 -0400
Received: from sb7.songbird.com (sb7.songbird.com [127.0.0.1]) by sb7.songbird.com (8.12.11.20060308/8.12.11) with ESMTP id k74NFvqO005456; Fri, 4 Aug 2006 16:15:57 -0700
Received: from snake.corp.yahoo.com (snake.corp.yahoo.com [216.145.52.229]) by sb7.songbird.com (8.12.11.20060308/8.12.11) with SMTP id k74NFplh005436 for <ietf-dkim@mipassoc.org>; Fri, 4 Aug 2006 16:15:51 -0700
Received: (qmail 71842 invoked by uid 6042); 4 Aug 2006 23:15:26 -0000
Delivered-To: markd-intercept-ietf-dkim@mipassoc.org
DomainKey-Trace: U=http://domainkeys.sourceforge.net; V=$Revision: 1.4 $; h=::::::::::12::::::::::::::::::::::40::::::::1:1::2:1:14:26:1:42:15:21:14:21:10:12:6:14:4:17:2:8:1:8::10:3:3:4:8::3:::2:::2:5:1::1::4:3:4::1:::::1::1::::19:2:28:8:37:6:5:3:35:1:8:11:28:21:35:8:3:11:16:17:7:2:1:2:6; H=::::::::::12:::12:::::::::::::::::::40::::::::1:1::2:1:14:26:1:42:15:21:14:21:10:12:6:14:4:17:2:8:1:8::10:3:3:4:8::3:::2:::2:5:1::1::4:3:4::1:::::1::1::::19:2:28:8:37:6:5:3:35:1:8:11:28:21:35:8:3:11:16:17:7:2:1:2:6; b=::::::::::17::::::::::::::::::::::104::2:::::2:1:1:::6:1:5::7::1:1:5::2::::3::::6:1::2:::::1:::5:1::1:2::1:2:::2:1:::::::::::::42:8:16:12:51:16:14:16:38::6:31:9:31:35:3:1:23:29:38:14:4:8::9; B=::::::::::17:::17:::::::::::::::::::104::2:::::2:1:1:::6:1:5::7::1:1:5::2::::3::::6:1::2:::::1:::5:1::1:2::1:2:::2:1:::::::::::::42:8:16:12:51:16:14:16:38::6:31:9:31:35:3:1:23:29:38:14:4:8::9;
DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; q=dns; c=simple; s=snake; d=yahoo-inc.com; b=BU8BFJMpC2SO7/ldYqReMmNdBfxXvO3Sa0IN632V40BQxJX04zbhCai3tw3jRi9V
Received: (qmail 71836 invoked by uid 6042); 4 Aug 2006 23:15:26 -0000
Message-ID: <20060804231526.71834.qmail@snake.corp.yahoo.com>
Date: Fri, 04 Aug 2006 23:15:26 +0000
From: Mark Delany <MarkD+dkim@yahoo-inc.com>
To: ietf-dkim@mipassoc.org
Subject: Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom
Mail-Followup-To: ietf-dkim@mipassoc.org
References: <20060804173538.54245.qmail@simone.iecc.com> <44D3C0BB.9000405@mtcc.com> <20060804174955.N15734@simone.iecc.com> <44D3C8DB.4070101@mtcc.com> <20060804184321.L23892@simone.iecc.com>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
Content-Disposition: inline
In-Reply-To: <20060804184321.L23892@simone.iecc.com>
X-Songbird: Clean, Clean
X-BeenThere: ietf-dkim@mipassoc.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.5
Precedence: list
List-Id: IETF DKIM Discussion List <ietf-dkim.mipassoc.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <http://mipassoc.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf-dkim>, <mailto:ietf-dkim-request@mipassoc.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://mipassoc.org/pipermail/ietf-dkim>
List-Post: <mailto:ietf-dkim@mipassoc.org>
List-Help: <mailto:ietf-dkim-request@mipassoc.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <http://mipassoc.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf-dkim>, <mailto:ietf-dkim-request@mipassoc.org?subject=subscribe>
Sender: ietf-dkim-bounces@mipassoc.org
Errors-To: ietf-dkim-bounces@mipassoc.org
X-SongbirdInformation: support@songbird.com for more information
X-Songbird-From: ietf-dkim-bounces@mipassoc.org
X-Spam-Score: 0.0 (/)
X-Scan-Signature: d6b246023072368de71562c0ab503126

On Fri, Aug 04, 2006 at 06:44:34PM -0400, John L allegedly wrote:
> >I cannot see how SSP can do anything but make false positives more 
> >likely. The real question is whether the gain in eliminating harmful 
> >mail is worth the occassional false positive.

I guess I'm a little confused about the false policy concern.

If a signer wants to take that risk, isn't that for them to decide?

Also, if the usual strategy of a verifier is to bounce (or be
encouraged to bounce) the offending email, a "I sign all" sender will
almost always know about delivery failures of originally signed
traffic and be able to act accordingly.


Mark.
_______________________________________________
NOTE WELL: This list operates according to 
http://mipassoc.org/dkim/ietf-list-rules.html

v2.23.0 | Report a Bug | By Email