Re: [ietf-dkim] SSP requirements

[Stephen Farrell <[e-mail]>]

Yet another post that seems (hard to tell) to contain no
new technical points that may help us in working on SSP.

Please desist,
Stephen.

Douglas Otis wrote:
> On Tue, 2006-08-08 at 04:55 -0400, Hector Santos wrote:
>> ----- Original Message -----
>> From: "Mark Delany" <[e-mail]>
>> To: <[e-mail]>
>>
>>> I will say that that I think that John's DAC venture is exactly what
>>> we had hoped would be an outcome of this process. May there be many
>>> more DAC competitors emerging as DKIM is deployed.
>> Mark,
>>
>> But will there be a standard?   Market segment XYZ uses this? Market segment
>> ABC uses that?
>>
>> Will DKIM-BASE become a "Batteries Required" protocol?
> 
> Bad actors are able to sign with DKIM and establish any favorable
> policy.  Good actors may be less inclined to assert the same policy when
> it might cause a percentage of their email to be rejected or discarded.
> Bad actors already expect many of their messages to be rejected, and
> don't care what happens when common services are used.  A bad actor
> might try spoofing as a common service, but likely with less success. 
> 
> An alignment with the From, signing domain, and a policy record will not
> curtail spoofed return paths without also causing the loss of valid
> emails from good actors.  A DKIM client policy may help, but not the
> DKIM From policy.  Even here, there can be no absolute policy asserted
> without causing loss of email for a typical good actor.  Don't expect
> the bad actor to care.
> 
> Devising a set of obstacles through which email is to navigate will not
> eliminate a need to track source histories.  Only this history curtails
> email from bad actors.  When doing so, this history must track an
> unlimited number of domain names.  White-listing may bypass some
> messages from the tracking process, however a growing percentage will be
> from a highly diverse array of domain names.
> 
> Either the goal is to accept email from just the mega-domains (which
> will continue to have their abuse issues), or something is planned that
> is not apparent. The obstacle course favors the bad over the good actor.
> So don't throw out your batteries, they are still needed to retain your
> history information.
> 
> -Doug 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> NOTE WELL: This list operates according to 
> http://mipassoc.org/dkim/ietf-list-rules.html
> 

_______________________________________________
NOTE WELL: This list operates according to 
http://mipassoc.org/dkim/ietf-list-rules.html