Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom
Michael Thomas <mike@mtcc.com> Thu, 03 August 2006 19:13 UTC
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Date: Thu, 03 Aug 2006 12:10:24 -0700
From: Michael Thomas <mike@mtcc.com>
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Subject: Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom
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John L wrote: >> Please don't shoot the messanger: I'm just asking. > > > I hadn't intended to shoot, sorry if it came across that way. You're > right, people find all sorts of other uses for successful protocols, > but those uses tend to be "pull", repurpose info already used for > something else rather than "push", stick in the data and see if anyone > cares. The way we're trying to define SSP is really risky since we > have, as far as I can tell, no operational experience at all with > anything SSP-like so we're just guessing about what will be useful. > > It seems to me that so far we have two, maybe three, items that a > sender could publish that would plausibly be useful to a recipient > trying to decide what to do with an incoming message that isn't > self-signed. > > "I send no mail" is about the strongest possible hint that the message > is forged, and the recipient doesn't want it. > > "I sign all mail" is the next strongest hint, saying to me that the > sender believes it has its outgoing mail firmly enough under control > that an unsigned message is more likely to be a phish than a damaged > real message. As I've said before, there are really two different subclasses of this one. You can have your mail very well under control, but you don't have control over what the damage might be in transit. For some people like banks and phishing targets, that collateral damage is likely to be acceptable. For most everybody else it's not. So I guess it just intrinsically bugs me that the former is a pretty rarified class of sender, and is SSP really _only_ for them? (leaving I send no mail aside). Is there little or no value in knowing that you sign everything, but transit related damage is possible? > > The third is "<foo> signs all my mail", if it turns out that there > actually exist foo's that reliable enough to delegate's one's signing, > and that it's easier to do that than to sign in the MUA or to provide > signing keys so that foo can put on the sender's signature. This is sort of orthogonal to the previous: it's just saying _who_ is doing it, so the previous considerations of "I sign all mail" still appy. > > So my suggestion would be to use a format similar to the one we use > for the signatures, put the first two items in the spec, and use a > syntax that permits people to experiment with new items and propose > the useful ones for later standardization. > I'm mostly on the keep it simple side as well -- I'm mainly pushing on these things to get issue out in the open so they can be considered and likely closed. I have seen some pushback on "standardize later" tact, but I think you're right that this isn't the same as, say, dkim-base where we're not very likely to get an opportunity for version 2.0. But it shouldn't hurt to just add stuff to the policy record -- possibly non-standard experimental stuff -- and if it's useful and relevant, users of the protocol will almost certainly have an incentive to upgrade their software to take advantage of it. This is in stark contrast to the -base upgrade problem where the signer has no clue of the capabilities of the receiver, so backward compatibility is huge concern. Mike _______________________________________________ NOTE WELL: This list operates according to http://mipassoc.org/dkim/ietf-list-rules.html
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Paul Hoffman
- [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom John L
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Dave Crocker
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom wayne
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Scott Kitterman
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Dave Crocker
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Michael Thomas
- RE: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Arvel Hathcock
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Dave Crocker
- RE: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Bill.Oxley
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Dave Crocker
- RE: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Arvel Hathcock
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Douglas Otis
- RE: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Arvel Hathcock
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Hector Santos
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Arvel Hathcock
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Damon
- RE: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Paul Hoffman
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Michael Thomas
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom John L
- RE: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Bill.Oxley
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Dave Crocker
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom John L
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Douglas Otis
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Michael Thomas
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom John L
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Douglas Otis
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Hector Santos
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Michael Thomas
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom John L
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Michael Thomas
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Damon
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom John L
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Michael Thomas
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Stephen Farrell
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Dave Crocker
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Douglas Otis
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Michael Thomas
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Steve Atkins
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Damon
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Michael Thomas
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Damon
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Michael Thomas
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Michael Thomas
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Steve Atkins
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Michael Thomas
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Hector Santos
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom John L
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Damon
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom John L
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom John Levine
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Douglas Otis
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom John L
- [ietf-dkim] SSP thought experiment John L
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Douglas Otis
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Damon
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Damon
- Re: [ietf-dkim] SSP thought experiment Douglas Otis
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Damon
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Damon
- RE: [ietf-dkim] SSP thought experiment Bill.Oxley
- RE: [ietf-dkim] SSP thought experiment John L
- RE: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Hallam-Baker, Phillip
- RE: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom John L
- RE: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Hallam-Baker, Phillip
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Dave Crocker
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Dave Crocker
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom wayne
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Michael Thomas
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Damon
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Hector Santos
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Michael Thomas
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Hector Santos
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Michael Thomas
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Michael Thomas
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Damon
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Hector Santos
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Damon
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Damon
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom John L
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom william(at)elan.net
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Michael Thomas
- RE: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Bill.Oxley
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Hector Santos
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Damon
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom John L
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Michael Thomas
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Michael Thomas
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Dave Crocker
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Mark Delany
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Damon
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Damon
- RE: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Arvel Hathcock
- RE: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Arvel Hathcock
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Damon
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Michael Thomas
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom william(at)elan.net
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Damon
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Damon
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Damon
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Mark Delany
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Douglas Otis
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Hector Santos
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Michael Thomas
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Damon
- RE: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Bill.Oxley
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Mark Delany
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Michael Thomas
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Hector Santos
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom John Levine
- RE: [ietf-dkim] SSP requirements Bill.Oxley
- [ietf-dkim] punting into near-term standardization Dave Crocker
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Mark Delany
- RE: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Bill.Oxley
- Re: [ietf-dkim] SSP requirements Mark Delany
- RE: [ietf-dkim] SSP requirements John L
- RE: [ietf-dkim] SSP requirements Bill.Oxley
- Re: [ietf-dkim] SSP requirements John Levine
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Douglas Otis
- Re: [ietf-dkim] punting into near-term standardiz… Arvel Hathcock
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Hector Santos
- Re: [ietf-dkim] SSP requirements Michael Thomas
- Re: [ietf-dkim] SSP requirements Hector Santos
- Re: [ietf-dkim] SSP requirements John L
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Douglas Otis
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Douglas Otis
- Re: [ietf-dkim] SSP requirements Hector Santos
- Re: [ietf-dkim] SSP requirements Douglas Otis
- Re: [ietf-dkim] SSP requirements william(at)elan.net
- Re: [ietf-dkim] SSP requirements Michael Thomas
- [ietf-dkim] The problem with sender policy John L
- [ietf-dkim] DKIM Client Policy Requirement Douglas Otis
- RE: [ietf-dkim] The problem with sender policy Bill.Oxley
- RE: [ietf-dkim] The problem with sender policy John L
- Re: [ietf-dkim] SSP requirements Mark Delany
- RE: [ietf-dkim] The problem with sender policy william(at)elan.net
- Re: [ietf-dkim] SSP requirements Douglas Otis
- Re: [ietf-dkim] SSP requirements Hector Santos
- Re: [ietf-dkim] SSP requirements Dave Crocker
- Re: [ietf-dkim] punting into near-term standardiz… Hector Santos
- Re: [ietf-dkim] punting into near-term standardiz… Douglas Otis
- Re: [ietf-dkim] SSP requirements Stephen Farrell
- Re: [ietf-dkim] SSP requirements Stephen Farrell
- Re: [ietf-dkim] SSP requirements Hector Santos
- Re: [ietf-dkim] SSP requirements Hector Santos
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Scott Kitterman
- Re: [ietf-dkim] The problem with sender policy Arvel Hathcock
- Re: [ietf-dkim] SSP requirements Damon
- Re: [ietf-dkim] The problem with sender policy Damon
- Re: [ietf-dkim] SSP requirements Damon
- Re: [ietf-dkim] SSP requirements Damon
- Re: [ietf-dkim] SSP requirements Hector Santos
- Re: [ietf-dkim] The problem with sender policy Jeff Macdonald
- RE: [ietf-dkim] The problem with sender policy Bill.Oxley
- Re: [ietf-dkim] The problem with sender policy Dave Crocker
- Re: [ietf-dkim] The problem with sender policy Jeff Macdonald
- Re: [ietf-dkim] SSP requirements Douglas Otis
- Re: [ietf-dkim] SSP requirements Stephen Farrell
- Re: [ietf-dkim] A more fundamental SSP axiom Graham Murray